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1. Introduction 
 
In 2001 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a set of scenarios in the 
Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES). These scenarios have been developed in a four year 
process with many scientists involved in the writing and the review process. The SRES scenarios 
played an important role in the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the IPCC and will be used in the 
upcoming Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). The 21st IPCC plenary session (November 2003) 
decided that no new baseline scenario would be prepared for the AR4, in view of the time it takes 
before new scenarios are taken up by the research community and used in publications. The 23rd 
Panel session decided that two meetings under the auspices of Working Group III on the issue of 
the use of scenarios should take place. The first meeting aimed to discuss the use of SRES scenarios 
in AR4. This expert meeting took place 12 – 14 January 2005 in Washington DC and the results are 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/meet/washington.pdf 
 
The IPCC at its 22nd Session (November 2004) decided that possible future roles of IPCC in new 
scenarios (to be used for AR5) would be discussed at its 24th Session (26-28 September 2005, 
Montreal, Canada). To prepare for these discussions, a second meeting on new emission scenarios 
was held from 29 June – 1 July 2005, hosted by IIASA in Laxenburg, Austria. It was decided that 
this meeting should be an IPCC Workshop with about 100 participants selected by the Chair of 
IPCC from government and organization nominations.  
 
The objective of the workshop was to investigate the possible roles that IPCC could play in the 
development and assessment of new emission scenarios in the period after AR4. The workshop 
should achieve the objective by: 
(i) Evaluating user needs and requirements: what are the future needs of governments, scientists, 
private sector and NGOs dealing with climate change with respect to new emission scenarios; 
to what extent have current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs? 
(ii) Identifying what kind of scenarios could meet these user needs and requirements. 
(iii) Discussing options for the role of IPCC with regard to development of new scenarios, with a 
view to provide recommendations to the 24th Session of the IPCC in September 2005 for 
consideration and decision. 
 
This report summarises the main findings of this meeting 
 
2. Organisation, invitation process and submissions  
 
2. 1. The organisation. 
The meeting was organised with extensive assistance of a program committee, chaired by Bert 
Metz, co-chair of IPCC Working Group III. The program committee decided on the program, the 
speakers and chairs and the deliverables of the break out groups (see title page for members of the 
programme committee). 
 
2.2. Submissions of views 
 
As an important step in the preparation of the workshop, The IPCC Secretary  requested ( 1 March 
2005), governments and international organizations  to submit their views on the following 
questions: 
 
(i) What are your future needs with respect to new emission scenarios; to what extent have 
current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs? 
(ii) What kind of scenarios could meet your future needs and requirements? 
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(iii) What possible roles could IPCC play in the development of new scenarios, in light of the 
outcomes of the discussion on objectives (i) and (ii)? Options may include: 
a. No specific role, other than assessing existing scenario literature, 
b. Organize a process with the scientific community in developing new scenarios 
(driven by the modellers), 
c. Develop new scenarios, as was the case with IS92 and SRES scenarios. 
 
This request was done in order to obtain a broad range of views  from the main ‘clients’ of IPCC, 
being the governments that are members to the  Panel, as input to the discussions at the workshop.  
 
IPCC received 11 submissions from industrialised countries, 9 from developing countries and 2 
from (international) organisations (see Annex II). The submissions have been published on the 
closed website prior to the meeting and have been distributed at the meeting.  
 
2.3. The nomination and invitation process  
The IPCC secretary, on behalf of the IPCC chair also requested governments and organisations to 
nominate participants (letter of 1 March 2005). The aim was to have participants from different 
emission scenario user groups: governments, scientists, private sector and NGOs, with expertise 
either in using emission scenarios and their results, or in developing emission scenarios. In total 
IPCC received around 230 nominations for participants and selected 111 invitees (excl. IPCC 
officials.) based on a balance of geographical background, developed / developing and EIT 
countries, expertise areas,  user groups (climate modelling , impacts, adaptation, and mitigation 
science, policy makers, private sector and NGO) and gender. In total 91 experts participated. 
Among them were 48 scientists, 30 policy makers, 7 private sector and 3 NGOs. Among them were 
17 women and 38 participants from developing countries or countries with economies in transition 
(see Annex III for the list of participants) 
 
3. Short summary of the sessions 
 
3.1. Opening session 
 
The workshop was opened by Leen Hordijk, Director of IIASA, Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman 
IPCC, Bert Metz, co-chair IPCC WGIII and Bert Bolin, previous and honorary chairman of IPCC. 
In the opening session a brief introduction was given on the previous IPCC scenarios. The first 
scenarios, the SA90, were developed in 1990, followed by the IS92 scenarios in 1992. After the 
evaluation of these scenarios in a Special Report in 1994, the IPCC decided in 1996 to start with the 
SRES process, resulting in the Special Report on Emission Scenarios in 2000.  
 
In his keynote talk, Prof. Bolin stated that it would be important for any future scenarios to reflect 
the basic elements determining the emissions. On the short term emissions can be projected and the 
impacts related to these emissions should be analysed. Special attention should be given to the 
inertia of the earth system related to the impacts of the short term emissions. Disaggregation of the 
assumptions, the outcomes and the regions is crucial to make a good estimate of short term 
emissions.  
 
3.2. Session 1: Historical IPCC scenarios; IS92, the “95”overview, SRES and TAR 
 
In session 1 the previous IPCC scenarios were introduced and compared by Nebojša Nakienovi 
(IIASA). He summarized the purposes of scenarios as they have been given in the Special Report 
(1994) on evaluating IS 92 scenarios: 
• Purpose 1: Evaluate the environmental and climatic consequences of “non-intervention” futures 
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• Purpose 2: Evaluate the environmental and climatic consequences of “intervention” futures 
• Purpose 3: Examine the feasibility and costs of mitigating GHGs from different regions and 
sectors 
• Purpose 4: Describe possible emissions reductions for different countries and regions.  
 
 SA90 IS92 SRES TAR 
Purpose 1 YES YES YES NO 
Purpose 2 YES NO NO YES 
Purpose 3 NO NO NO YES 
Purpose 4 NO(?) NO(?) NO(?) NO(?) 
 
According to Prof Nakienovi, there seems an interesting contradiction when considering different 
user groups as scientific assessments require complexity: the treatment of uncertainties across 
models, inclusion of drivers, spatial and temporal disaggretated assessments – all require large 
ensembles of scenarios. On the other hand policy makers’ prefer simplicity and a focus on single 
projections, or “high likelihood” scenarios (BAU). 
 
3.3. Session 2: Evaluating user needs & requirements and overview of submissions 
 
In this session, chaired by Brian Fisher (ABARE) the a summary of  the submitted views were 
presented by Leo Meyer and statements were given on the user needs and requirements from 
various backgrounds: from a climate modelling perspective (Martin Manning (head TSU WGI), 
from an impact, adaptation and vulnerability perspective (Tim Carter, SKYE)), from a mitigation 
analysis perspective (Jiang Kejun, ERI), from a policy perspective (Jim Penman, DEFRA), a private 
sector perspective (Brian Flannery, Exxon Mobile) and an ENGO perspective (Jennifer Morgan, 
WWF).  
 
The needs and requirements emerging from these presentations were broad. The needs and 
requirements from the different user groups were not contrasting and had a strong overlap. 
Summarizing, the following user needs and requirements have been proposed: 
 
• Consistent, transparent and accurate emission scenarios, especially consistent set of 
assumptions and input and /or output of emission scenarios; 
• A basis for risk and impact analyses, should reveal what outcomes of particular sets of 
decisions would be, the framework for decision making would be the UNFCCC; 
• More regional, local/national and/or sectoral disaggregated scenarios, for aerosols a very high 
resolution is required; 
• Technological development specifically included; 
• Multi-gas scenarios and more insight in the distribution of pollutants, both spatial as vertical 
distribution; 
• Medium and short term (20 – 30 years) (reference or baseline) scenarios, as well as long-term 
(> 30 years) scenarios; 
• Include linkages with adaptation and include feedbacks with impacts & adaptation 
• Include of linkages and feedbacks with economic development and land-use change 
• Baseline/reference/BAU combined with mitigation/policy scenarios for short/medium term; 
long term stabilisation scenarios 
• Integrate with feedbacks and impacts with other issues is important, non –climate (air pollution, 
stratospheric ozone, land use) policy areas. 
• Include sufficient information on the possible uncertainties. 
• Develop probability density functions for reference and stabilisation scenarios 
• Not too many scenarios, because of the increased complexity and the lack of variation in GCM 
modelling results.  
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• Scenario starting points that are consistent with contemporary global emission inventories and 
trends. 
 
 
3.4. Session 3: Overview of scenario aspects; what types are most effective for what purposes (1)? 
 
In this session chaired by Arnulf Grübler (IIASA) an overview was given on what types of 
scenarios are most effective. Different methodological aspects where introduced (Ferenc Toth, 
IAEA), uncertainties in relation to scenarios (Richard Moss, co-chair TGICA & US Climate change 
science program, University of Maryland), maintaining consistency in driving forces (Shukla 
(IIMA), presented by Holger Rogner (IAEA) and the relationship between baseline scenarios and 
policy intervention scenarios (Emilio la Rovere, COPPE/UFRJ), were furthermore covered. 
 
Introduction to scenario types (Ferenc Toth) 
Eight contrasting scenario types and designs have been introduced  
 
“Input only”: external factors, drivers for models, analyses (IPCC) vs “Self-contained”: complete 
“future history” of driving forces and implications: effects, feedbacks, responses (MEA). 
 
“Reference + variants”: persistent trends and “dynamics as usual” 
(saturation/depletion/collisions/trend breaks) (IS92) vs “Contrasting futures”: 1/2/3 dimensions of 
opposite poles of main future directions (drivers or outcomes) (SRES,MEA) 
 
“Skeleton”: numbers only, w/some explanations (IS92) vs “Storylines”: also include narrative 
descriptions (SRES) (not equivalent to the quantitative-qualitative contrast) 
 
“Deterministic”: no likelihood assigned (IPCC to date) vs “Probabilistic”: a likelihood of 
occurrence is derived or estimated (RA/RM: key to assess hedging costs/benefits and to craft 
hedging strategies) 
 
The usefulness of each scenario type for different scenario purposes have been indicated and scored 
on the usefulness for different scenario purposes: 
 
Scenario 
type/Purpose 
Input 
only 
self 
contained 
Reference 
+ variants   
Contrasting 
futures 
Skeleton Storylines Deterministic Probabilistic 
Scientific 
assessment 
XXXX X XXXX X XXXX X XXXX X 
Exploration  X XXXX X XXXX XX XXX XXXX X 
Public policy 
making 
X XXXX XXXX X X XXXX X XXXX 
Public policy 
planning 
X XXXX XXXX X X XXXX X XXXX 
Strategic 
planning 
XX XXX X XXXX X XXXX XXX XX 
Education X XXXX XXX XX X XXXX XXXX X 
Moralizing X XXXX XX XXX  XXXXX XXXX X 
 
Many combinations of scenarios are possible; there is flexibility to choose the most appropriate 
design according to purpose & function. Some combinations appear to be difficult: 
 - Self-contained and skeleton as self-contained scenarios need storylines 
 - Contrasting futures and skeleton as contrasting futures scenarios need storylines, to ensure the 
contrast in the scenarios. 
 - It seems difficult to assign probabilities to contrasting futures scenarios 
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Dealing with uncertainty in scenarios (Richard Moss) 
Uncertainties are a key issue in all climate change scenarios. Scenarios should support analysis of 
most significant uncertainties of all important parameters. There are two broad approaches for 
analyzing scenario uncertainty: 
• Using narratives 
• Using probabilistic approaches 
These two approaches are distinct but complementary. Combining the two approaches improves the 
results and the communication. For future scenarios it would be important for IPCC to improve 
consideration of uncertainty in the overall design of its next assessment. It needs to take into 
account the feedbacks between affluence and capacity to adapt and mitigate.  
 
Maintaining consistency in drivers (Shukla/Rogner): 
The drivers within storylines are not independent of each other, there are relationships and 
dynamics between drivers, e.g. fuel prices, energy resource endowments, etc. Consistency between 
the most important driving forces is a necessary prerequisites for plausible scenarios, and 
disaggregated scenarios need even greater attention for consistency. Furthermore, the storyline 
content need to be comprehensive; this means that there should be a check whether there are no 
missing drivers, missing relationships, missing dynamics, missing milestones (e.g. convergence, 
stabilization). Especially missing dependencies is a major cause for inconsistency within scenarios. 
Alternate approaches for storylines are probabilistic approaches and agent based scenarios. These 
approaches need evaluation and consideration.  
 
Baseline and policy intervention and standard response (stabilization) scenarios (Emilio La 
Rovere): 
Baseline scenarios include non-climate policies with significant effects on climate. They can be 
used as illustrating cost/benefits of non-action versus action on climate change.  
For future work, it can be useful to: 
• Study non-intervention baselines to evaluate results of climate policies; avoided emissions and 
impacts; 
• Develop baseline scenarios including climate policies, as these are needed for better exploration 
of possible futures; 
• Focus on multi-gases ad sinks; 
• Investigate different stabilization metrics. 
 
3. 5. Session 4: Overview of scenario aspects; what types are most effective for what purposes 
(2)? 
 
Session 4 is a continuation of session 3, chaired by Gilberto Gallopin (UN Division of Environment 
and Human Settlements). It included presentations on the integration of climate change with other 
issues like with air pollution (Ron Prinn, MIT) and land-use and ecological issues (Dale Rothman, 
Macaulay Institute) and on the regional and sectoral breakdown of short term scenarios (Laura 
Cozzi, IEA).  
 
Integration with air pollution (Ron Prinn): 
Emission projections need to include all the major human-driven emissions forcing climate change; 
this would include greenhouse gases, other anthropogenic forcings (e.g. land cover changes, 
aerosols) and natural forcings. Economics/emission models need to include all major emitting 
sectors and all major emitting nations/regions.  
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There are strong linkages and feedbacks between the anthropogenic gases, like O3, NOX, SOX, and 
CH4. For instance, tropospheric ozone negatively influences the biological CO2 sink. The effects on 
the climate can also be opposing and therefore there is a need to integrate climate change and air 
pollution carefully.  Probabilistic emission projections are needed, with special attention to the 
‘tails’ in the distribution. 
 
GHG emissions integrated with environmental and sustainability scenarios (Dale Rotman) 
There are inter-linkages between: 
• individual environmental impacts; 
• environmental impacts and ecosystem services; 
• ecosystem services and human well-being; 
• temporal, spatial and within society between groups. 
 
The pros and cons of embedding emission scenarios in integrated scenarios are: 
 Pros: 
• Promise of better representation of inter-linkages and feedbacks; 
• Identification of synergies and tradeoffs; 
• Leverage existing and ongoing works; 
• May be easier for users to cope with a “generic” set of scenarios.  
Cons: 
• May cloud climate policy issues; 
• May lead to less detail on specific issues; 
• Transaction costs in working across more disciplines (conceptual frameworks, terminology); 
• Where do you stop? 
 
Regionally, economically or sectorally disaggregated short and medium-term scenarios 
(Laura Cozzi) 
The World Energy Model of the IEA is an example of a regionally, economically, sectorally 
disaggregated least-cost model with a timeframe until 2030. The outputs are the energy supply, 
demand and trade and related CO2 emissions. The model is updated every 2 years. 
 
The IEA analyses one reference case and one alternative scenario (policy and technology 
simulation). The model and its results have been increasingly used by energy community (from 
industry to governments, from financial institutions to academia). It also delivered input to the 
Johannesburg Summit. For the future they will also consider going beyond 2030. 
 
3.6. Session 5: Introducing the options for the roles that IPCC could play in the development and 
assessment of new emission scenarios in the period after AR4 
 
This session was chaired by Pierre Boileau (Environment Canada) and the role that IPCC could 
play was presented from different perspectives. As an input to the discussion, a range of options has 
been formulated: 
a) No specific role, other than assessing existing scenario literature, 
b) Organize a process with the scientific community in developing new scenarios (driven by the 
modellers), 
c) Develop new scenarios, as was the case with IS92 and SRES scenarios. 
 
Leo Meyer (TSU WGIII) summarized the views as they had been submitted by governments and 
two organisations. Most submissions preferred some active role (b or c) of IPCC in the development 
of new emission scenarios, varying from a supporting or facilitating role, where the scientists would 
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independently develop new scenarios, to full control by IPCC itself over the development of new 
scenarios,  
 
A panel of speakers presented their personal views on the possible role of IPCC after the AR4 as 
seen from their perspectives: Bill Hare (Greenpeace, Environmental NGO), Mustafa Babiker (Arab 
Planning Institute, Developing Country and OPEC), John Weyant (Stanford University, scientific 
community), Francisco de la Chesnaye (US EPA, USA), David Warrilow (DEFRA, UK), Shikegi 
Kobayashi (Toyota, Japan and private sector) and Javier García (Environmental National 
Commission, Chile) 
 
The speakers argued that there is a link between the type of scenarios that are needed and the role 
that IPCC could play. Furthermore, all argued that assessing literature is IPCC’s main task and 
should be done anyway. 
 
Bill Hare pointed out that a weak role of IPCC would lead to poor comparability of future emission 
scenarios, which would degrade the abilities to make integrated assessments. SRES was a big 
success but we need to go beyond that by regionalisation, include air pollution, different sustainable 
development pathways, and probabilistic approaches. 
Mustafa Babiker saw several roles for IPCC, both in development of holistic (aggregated) 
scenarios as well as of disaggregated scenarios. The latter are of specific important to developing 
countries and should include adaptation. IPCC could help to harmonize methodologies, to make 
aggregation to the ‘holistic’ level possible. IPCC could also play a role in capacity building in the 
construction of scenarios. 
John Weyant preferred IPCC not to be in control of the whole process. Credibility would be best 
assured by the scientific community. IPCC could be helpful to that in an advisory role. 
Francisco de la Chesnaye pointed out that role a) is consistent with the IPCC mandate and there 
would be no role for IPCC in developing scenarios itself. He saw a common ground emerging on 
role b). 
David Warrilow stated that IPCC should assess literature and also facilitate the production of a 
common set of emissions scenarios to ensure the consistency in terms of transparency of 
assumptions and continuity. Government needs like simplicity and transparency in assumptions, 
some elements of probability, widespread acceptability should be ensured by this process. For the 
same reasons  
Shikegi Kobayashi mentioned that Japan believes that option c would be most appropriate. Option 
b) may be acceptable, but the main thing is to achieve consistent and scientifically robust outcomes. 
Javier Garcia highlighted the need to improve the spatial and temporal resolution of emission 
scenarios, and the need for country- specific emission factors. IPCC could play a role in developing 
the methodologies and capacities allowing especially developing countries to build national 
scenarios.  
 
3.7. Session 6: (break out): Evaluation of scenario aspects that meet user requirements.  
 
The following questions are addressed and linked with the user requirements  
• Merits and practical limitations of different kinds of scenarios  
• Exploration of how user requirement can be addressed with different types of scenarios 
The participants were grouped in 4 user groups: 1) climate system, vulnerability and adaptation 
scientists, 2) mitigation scientists 3) and 4) Government, Private sector and NGOs.  In each of the 
latter two parallel groups, a scenario scientist was available as a resource person.    
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3.8. Session 7: Evaluation of feedback from break out groups 
 
In this session, the break out groups reported back to the plenary. The session was chaired by 
Holger Rogner (IAEA). The merits, limitations and usefulness of different types of scenarios were 
presented. The types of scenarios have been clustered in couples of contrasting scenario types.  
 
The groups produced independently similar results. In general it was concluded that there is a need 
for, transparent, credible and comparable scenarios, but not too many. 
 
Single baseline (reference + variants):  
+ A single baseline can reflect current trends likely to continue in the short term and are easier to 
communicate.  Variants of this baseline can be designed to allow climate modellers to investigate 
specific questions (e.g. the importance of aerosol emissions).  
- Single baselines do not adequately reflect long-term uncertainty in development pathways and are 
less relevant for longer term mitigation, adaptation, impact and vulnerability research 
 
Multiple baselines 
+ Multiple baselines span a wider range of socio-economic and emissions outcomes. By better 
reflecting uncertainty, they are more useful to mitigation, adaptation, impact and vulnerability 
research or assessment. 
- Too many baselines make communication of results difficult.  Also, some baselines may not 
produce substantially different emissions pathways and therefore will not produce significant 
differences in outcomes for the climate modelling community (although even in this case 
differences in socio-economic assumptions may be important for mitigation, adaptation, and 
vulnerability assessment). 
 
Use of numbers only (Skeleton) 
+ This can be interesting for sensitivity analysis 
- Situations that need to be modelled by the adaptation, impact and vulnerability researchers cannot 
be captured by numbers only – it is crucial to understand the socio-economic drivers. 
 
Storylines 
+ These are needed on order to identify drivers and the context which is important for mitigation, 
adaptation, impact and vulnerability research and assessment; storylines also contribute to 
consistency within scenarios   
- The merits can only be achieved if the storylines are transparent, with their driving forces (e.g. 
GDP, population, policies) quantified, and consistent with the past  
 
Baseline or Non-intervention scenarios 
+ Can be important for mitigation analysis if a comparison of outcomes between action and no- 
action is desired. 
- Baselines are often prone to subjective definitions of one team. Assumptions need to be carefully 
judged.  
 
Mitigation and stabilization scenarios 
+ Important for informing decision makers and stakeholders about potential costs and technological 
requirements of reducing emissions, including uncertainties. 
- It is important to have transparent and comparable scenarios  
 
Short term (20 – 30 years) and sectoral and regional disaggregated scenarios 
+ Short term, regionally disaggregated mitigation scenarios are needed for decision makers and 
adaptation, impact and vulnerability researchers. Climate modellers need them for the emissions of 
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less mixed gases with short lifetimes. It is more relevant for regional decision making and there will 
be a closer representation of the reality.  
- There is need for consistency between long term and short term scenarios. The required technical 
capacity (including computer resources) and the data availability are higher, which might be 
difficult, furthermore, when one needs to downscale data, guidance should be provided, if required.  
 
Long term (> 30 years) and aggregated regions and sectors 
+ Long term scenarios are needed for describing technological strategies and possible effects of 
R&D. A long term horizon is needed for climate modelling.  Global scenarios can also focus on 
main dynamics and may therefore be easier to communicate and it is easier to use a consistent 
approach.  
- There is need for consistency between long term and short term scenarios; the long term scenarios 
are less useful for regional policies and decision makers and adaptation, impact and vulnerability 
researchers. 
 
Climate change only scenarios 
+ Easier to communicate, very long term scenarios may be possible 
- Less policy relevant  
 
Climate change integrated with other issues  
+ Especially the linkages with air pollution, land-use and SD issues are important for mitigation, 
adaptation, impact and vulnerability researchers and decision makers, it presents a closer reflection 
of reality.  
- It increases complexity; there is a lot of information at detailed level required,  
 
Deterministic scenarios 
+ Easy incorporation of a larger degree of complexity, especially in combination with the 
integration of other issues; therefore, it is also easier to communicate compared to probabilistic 
approaches, in combination with sensitivity analysis might be interesting  
- Provides no indication of whether certain scenarios are considered more or less likely than others 
 
Probabilistic scenarios 
+ When meaningful likelihoods can be assigned, probabilistic approaches provide more information 
on uncertainty than deterministic scenarios. 
- It is difficult to develop and maintain transparency, make use of expert judgments and there is a 
potential danger of misunderstanding these scenarios.  In some cases knowledge may be insufficient 
to support likelihood judgments and therefore probabilities can be misleading. 
 
 
3.9. Session 8 (break out): Discussing the options for the roles that IPCC could play in the 
development and assessment of new emission scenarios in the period after AR4 
 
The participants were grouped in the same composition as in session 6 and discussed the different 
roles as presented in Session 5.  They addressed the following questions: 
• What arguments could be listed in favour or against each of these roles light the importance of 
scenario aspects for different user groups (as identified in the previous section)?  
• What would be the procedural implications of each of these roles? 
 
3.10. Session 9: Feedback from break out groups: different options for IPCC  
 
The chairs of all break out groups presented their outcomes to the plenary, chaired by Ogunlade 
Davidson. Again, the breakout groups produced some independently similar results. All groups 
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stated that IPCC should perform assessments of literature on emission scenarios. In addition, all 
groups agreed that IPCC should also do more than just that, namely provide some form of guidance 
or coordination for the scenario development work. Opinions varied on how intense this IPCC 
guidance/coordination should be. An issue that received a lot of attention was the degree of 
comparability of scenarios that would emerge in view of the use of these scenarios in a following 
IPCC assessment report. IPCC working group reports can be made consistent if they use the same 
scenarios to organise the assessments. Under option C, in which IPCC develops scenarios the 
coordination between the IPCC Working Groups would be easy and there would likely be 
comparable and consistent sets of scenarios. However, there could be a potential conflict of 
interest—i.e. IPCC both creating and assessing scenarios. 
  
Option B in which IPCC has some coordinating or organizing role received most support. This 
option is not yet defined but it has the following advantages: 
• Would provide potential for common or comparable assumptions and outputs.  
• Comparability across scenarios would be made possible. This option could also include 
scenarios for adaptation at regional level. 
• IPCC could develop a common set of storylines and then modellers would be free to follow 
their own interpretation.  
• Could provide a common basis for future modelling and impact studies.  
 
Some of the break-out groups presented a process description. One example: 
 
Step 1: IPCC identifies the interests and needs for scenario designs either by consulting IPCC 
Governments, holding a meeting or workshop, or other steps. 
Step 2: Development of underlying storylines or scenario design features is carried out by the 
emissions scenarios modelling community or IPCC, possibly requiring iteration with step 1.  
Step 3: Quantitative emission scenarios would be developed by the modelling community. There 
may be a role here for IPCC in funding or ensuring developing country involvement. 
Step 4: A limited number of characteristic or marker scenarios would be identified for use by the 
working groups in conjunction with Step 5. 
Step 5: The IPCC would undertake an assessment of the full set of scenarios. 
Step 6: Scenario results would be disseminated for use by research groups requiring cooperation 
between the IPCC and modelling groups.  
 
Identification of 
Needs &
Requirements
Development of 
storylines or 
scenario designs
Quantification 
of scenarios
Identification 
Of marker 
Scenarios
Dissemination 
of scenarios 
Assessment of
Scenarios
STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 STEP 4    STEP 6  STEP 5
IPCC IPCC/others IPCC IPCC IPCCModelling
community
 
 
Other groups presented some different ideas about the process.  
 
An additional remark made was the idea that IPCC could also initiate a process to provide 
guidelines to develop national scenarios (as for Inventories) in order to make easier the task for 
assessing climate related scenarios, specially for Developing Countries. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and results of the meeting 
 
  - 14 - 
4.1. Concluding session 
 
In session 10 chaired by Bert Metz, Brian Fisher presented an overview of the conclusions and 
results of the meeting, these have been commented by the plenary and below a summary is given, 
including the comments by the participants. 
 
Objective 1: Evaluating user needs and requirements: what are the future needs of governments, 
scientists, private sector and NGOs dealing with climate change with respect to new emission 
scenarios; to what extent have current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs?  
 
The purposes of emission scenarios have been addressed earlier in an IPCC report in 19941:  
 
• 1: As input to evaluate the environmental/climatic consequences of “non-intervention”, i.e. no 
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
• 2: As input to evaluating the environmental/climatic consequences of intervention to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions 
• 3: As input to examining the feasibility and costs of mitigating greenhouse gases from different 
regions and economic sectors, and over time. This purpose can include setting emission 
reduction targets and developing scenarios to reach these targets. It can also include examining 
the driving forces of emissions and sinks to identify which of these forces can be influenced by 
policies.  
• 4: As input for negotiating possible emission reductions for different countries and geographic 
regions 
 
Building on these results, the following additional purposes were introduced: 
• 5: Inform discussions and decisions on stabilisation levels 
• 6: Inform decisions on policy development and implementation by individual governments 
• 7: Assist governments in communication about climate change issues 
• 8: Inform integrated assessment and provide information to governments for the development of 
adaptation policy, research and assessment 
• 9: Exploration of the uncertainties of climate change and mitigation and adaptation responses 
 
Objective 2: Identifying what kind of scenarios could meet these user needs and requirements. 
 
First it was shown that different terminologies were used to classify and describe scenario types. 
More discussion on terminologies might be needed. 
  
The following characteristics of ‘good’ scenarios and their implementation in modelling has been 
given: 
 
• Transparency in numbers and assumptions 
• Comparability among scenario results 
• Internal & temporally consistency within scenario families 
• Scenarios that have credibility (i.e. cover a range of plausible range of futures) and legitimacy 
(i.e. involve key stakeholders in their development). 
• Policy relevant 
• Reproducible 
• High availability and dissemination 
• Easily communicated to the user-groups 
                                                          
1Houghton, J.T., L.G. Meira Filho, J. Bruce, Hoesung Lee, B.A. Callander, E. Haites, N. Harris, K. Maskell, Climate 
Change 1994: Radiative forcing of climate change and an evaluation of the IPCC IS92 emission scenaris, Canbridge 
University Press, 1994 
  - 15 - 
 
Table summarise the needs for different scenario types and designs. It was explicitly mentioned that 
the characteristics were not mutually excluding. It was for instance mentioned that trends during the 
next 25 – 30 years were better understood than trends over the longer term. A reference scenario for 
the shorter term might therefore be particularly useful for policy purposes. This can be followed by 
a longer term series of storylines or multiple baselines that would explore alternative futures.  
 
Table I: Summary on requested types of scenarios 
  Users have requested: but…. 
Single baselines 
  • Reference scenario + variants; useful for ST, next 25 
years  
• For decision makers increases simplicity 
• Does not reflect the range of possible futures in the 
long term and therefore may be misleading 
Multiple baselines 
  • For longer term analyses important to capture more of 
the socio-economic range and wide range of futures 
• Uncertainty can be better incorporated 
• For GCM models no variations in results if range is 
not large 
Storylines (+quantification) 
  • Important to increase consistency between emission 
scenarios and IAV (Impact, adaptation & 
Vulnerability), particularly for longer time scales 
• Transparency in the quantification of underlying 
driving forces (e.g. GDP, population, policies) is 
required, especially for decision makers 
• When you use storylines, base them on what has 
happened in the past 
Baseline scenarios 
  • For non-intervention futures and climate risk.  
• Basis for calculating mitigation costs 
 
• Baseline should include all relevant announced 
policies (e.g. baseline should include Kyoto and other 
established climate policy), this is difficult 
Policy intervention scenarios 
  • Distinction between ST mitigation & adaptation and 
LT stabilisation;  
• They need to be politically acceptable 
• Is it useful to have ‘representative’ mitigation or 
stabilisation scenarios? 
Short Term ( 20 – 30 years) 
  • Specific mitigation policy analysis  
• More policy relevant compared to LT scenarios.  
• Combined with regional and sectoral disaggregation 
• Data intensive and needs regular updating 
• Needs to ensure continuity between ST and LT 
Long Term ( > 30 years) 
  • For understanding issues related to risk, technology 
development, avoided damage etc 
• Also relevant to short term policy decisions 
Inclusion of more issues, not just GHG emissions 
  • Useful for assessment, address more questions. 
• Important include LULUCF and air pollution, SD. 
• May also be developed as building blocks  
• Specific questions may not be well addressed. 
• It may be more difficult to communicate the outcomes 
– different audiences 
Regionally and sectorally disaggregated 
  • Needed for IAV community and policy makers; e.g. 
for feedbacks mitigation and adaptation 
• Data and technical resources intensive (especially for 
DC) 
• For downscaling and upscaling guidance is needed 
• ‘Mappability’ into larger regions important 
Probabilistic 
  • Assessing effects of uncertainties in input on output;  • Difficult if based on expert judgements 
• Sensitivity analysis would be partial solution 
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Objective 3: Discussing options for the role of IPCC with regard to development of new scenarios, 
with a view to provide recommendations to the 24th Session of the IPCC in September 2005 for 
consideration and decision. 
 
Four different options for the future roles of IPCC with regard to new emission scenarios were 
identified. All options include a full assessment of available (emission) scenarios as published in the 
peer reviewed scientific literature. The options are listed with an increasing level of coordination by 
IPCC: 
 
A: IPCC completes assessment of the available literature on scenarios only 
B1 IPCC identifies a”Wish list” of issues that need to be included in the input and/or output of 
scenarios; subsequently, independent modellers develop scenarios; these scenarios are assessed by 
IPCC.  
B2: IPCC coordinates a process where common narrative and input and output parameters are 
jointly produced by scenario/ modelling groups; results are produced independently. 
C:  IPCC develops new scenarios under full IPCC control and produces an ‘IPCC product’ (‘SRES 
+’) 
 
Options B1 and B2 received most support from the participants.  
 
In Table II, the strengths and weaknesses of the different options are presented as identified by the 
Workshop. 
 
Table II: summary of options for future role of IPCC, strength, weakness and how to address the 
weakness 
Option Strength Weakness How to address weakness 
A • IPCC and modellers 
independent;  
• Assessment of scenarios can 
begin earlier 
• No guarantee that 
scenarios meeting user 
needs will be 
developed.  Without 
standard scenario set. 
• Few countries included 
• Strengthen assessment and 
choice of ‘representative’ 
results 
B1 • IPCC and modellers mostly 
independent 
 
• Results may not be 
directly comparable  
• DC participation not 
guaranteed 
• Frequent dialogue among 
modelling groups 
• Finance DC work 
B2 • Better comparability and 
consistency 
• Useful for difference analysis 
• DC Participation  
• Less independence 
modellers 
• Finance DC work 
• Open process,  reviews 
C • Comparable, consistent and 
easy coordination across 
WGs 
• Approved by IPCC Plenary 
• More risk of self-
serving literature 
• Time consuming 
process 
• Open process, reviews 
with independent teams 
 
Process: 
From the break-out group session it became clear that there are different modalities of possible 
processes, as far as the different steps and the timing are concerned. For both the B1 and B2 
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options, two different modalities are possible. Several process steps were proposed by the breakout 
groups. No further discussion of the processes and the pros and cons of the processes has taken 
place in the last plenary session. Below is the WGIII co-chairs summary of different processes that 
have been proposed in break out sessions. It reflects two options.  
 
Option 1: A process in which the development of scenarios and the use of scenarios in climate 
modelling, impact, adaptation and mitigation studies is done by the research community, after initial 
guidance/coordination by IPCC. This would then be followed by an IPCC assessment of the 
literature (in AR5), including identification of “representative scenarios”. 
 
Option 2: A process in which after the development of scenarios by the research community (after 
initial IPCC guidance/coordination) would first be assessed by IPCC (in a Special Report), before 
the result of this assessment (in the forum of e.g. “representative scenarios”) would be issued by the 
research community to produce climate modelling, impact, adaptation and mitigation studies, that 
would therefore be assessed (in AR5) 
 
Option 2 would require a substantially larger timeline, but would probably lead to more 
homogeneity in the literature that is to be assessed later. Option 1 would be quicker, but the 
comparability of the “representative scenarios” emerging from the assessment would depend more 
on the initial guidance/coordination. 
 
The processes are pictured In Annex I. 
 
 
4.2 Main conclusion 
 
The Workshop identified many different types of scenarios and a wide variety of scenario user 
needs and requirements of policy makers, the scientific community, NGOs and private sector. It 
was agreed that there is no single approach to scenario development that could satisfy all user 
needs, and that particular scenario types involve tradeoffs between meeting various needs.  For 
example, there are conflicting needs for simplicity on the one hand and regional and temporal detail 
on the other.  
 
Pros and cons of various future roles of IPCC were identified. All agreed that in the period after 
AR4, IPCC should continue assessing literature in emission scenarios. There was also discussion on 
the role of IPCC with regard to the genesis of new scenarios for the period after the AR4. Benefits 
and drawbacks were presented and argued. The vast majority of the workshop participants preferred 
IPCC to facilitate or coordinate the development of new emission scenarios by the scientific 
community, rather than IPCC developing new scenario itself, as was done in the past. More 
discussion is needed to clearly specify any level of involvement beyond the standard assessment 
role of IPCC. A key trade-off identified is that a stronger IPCC coordination is more likely to 
produce a common and consistent set of scenarios that can be used in assessments across IPCC 
working groups, but a dominant coordination role of IPCC could be perceived as a potential conflict 
of interest with IPCC both generating and assessing scenarios. 
 
Annex I: Presentation of two examples of process 
Assessment of
literature
‘declare’
representative
scenarios
Development
of scenarios
Studies, 
using scenarios
IPCCIPCC
implementation
Scenario/ 
model groups
Other
research
groups
Policy user community
Option B1: ProcessUser requests
 
 
Assessment
of
scenarios
“declare”
representative
scenarios
Development
Of scenarios
Studies, 
using
scenarios
IPCCIPCC
implementation
Scenario/
model groups
Other
research
groups
Policy user community
Option B2 ProcessUser needs
Assessment
of
literature
IPCC
implementation
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Annex II 
 
 
 
Programme IPCC Workshop on new emission scenarios 
29 June – 1 July 2005 
Laxenburg 
 
 
 
 
 
Goals and deliverables  
The objective of the workshop is to investigate the possible roles that IPCC could play in the 
development and assessment of new emission scenarios in the period after AR4. The workshop 
should achieve the objective by: 
(i) Evaluating user needs and requirements: what are the future needs of governments, 
scientists, private sector and NGOs dealing with climate change with respect to new 
emission scenarios; to what extent have current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled 
those needs? To this end, IPCC will ask these user communities for submissions well in 
advance of the workshop.  
(ii) Identifying what kind of scenarios could meet these user needs and requirements. 
(iii) Discussing options for the role of IPCC with regard to development of new scenarios, with a 
view to provide recommendations to the 24th Session of the IPCC in September 2005 for 
consideration and decision. 
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Annex III 
 
Overview of all Submissions of Views for the IPCC Workshop on New Emission Scenarios 
 
The IPCC Secretary requested (1 March 2005), governments and international organizations to submit 
their views on the following questions: 
 
(i) What are your future needs with respect to new emission scenarios; to what extent have current 
and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs? 
(ii) What kind of scenarios could meet your future needs and requirements? 
(iii) What possible roles could IPCC play in the development of new scenarios, in light of the 
outcomes of the discussion on objectives (i) and (ii)? Options may include: 
a. No specific role, other than assessing existing scenario literature, 
b. Organize a process with the scientific community in developing new scenarios (driven 
by the modellers), 
c. Develop new scenarios, as was the case with IS92 and SRES scenarios. 
 
This request was done in order to obtain a broad range of views  from the main ‘clients’ of IPCC, being 
the governments that are members to the  Panel, as input to the discussions at the workshop. This 
Annex provides the submitted views as received by IPCC. 
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Albania 
ALBANIA proposal 
Some ideas for the IPCC-WGIII Workshop on New Emission Scenarios 
 
 
Within the framework of the project Enabling Albania to prepare its First National Communication to the CoP 
of the UNFCCC, in Vulnerability & Adaptation Assessment  activity, are prepared the  climate change 
scenarios for Albania by using the MAGICC/SCENGEN software, developed by CRU/UEA. 
 
To  estimate the global changes,  MAGICC is run by using the mid- range IS92a emission scenario as 
the reference scenario SRESA1, SRESA2, SRESB1 and SRESB2  as policy scenarios.  To develop a 
mean pattern of future climate change,   GCM experiments: HadCM2, UKTR, ECHAM4, CSIRO-TR, 
UIUC-EQ, GFDLLO are considered   and a composite pattern is constructed.  
 
As main outputs during this activity we may order: 
• SRESA2 (high climate sensitivity) as more optimistic.  
• need for finer resolution of outputs 
• need for regional scenarios is stressed   
• in this stage of work was very difficult to deal with uncertainties 
 
Referring to the objectives of the IPCC-WGIII Workshop on New Emission Scenarios we may 
distinguish the need to develop: 
• short and medium scenarios, as more realistic 
• regionally, economically disaggregated scenarios 
• coverage of the socioeconomic drivers behind both emission  and V&A scenarios 
• relation of climate scenarios with climate implication models/scenarios 
 
We think that IPCC will play an important role in the development of   regional scenarios  (driven by 
modelers) involving the experts from developing countries and countries with economies in transition.   
 
 
  
  
Prepared by: 
 
Eglantina Bruci 
Institute of Hydrometrology of Albania
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12 April 2005 
 
Austria 
Submission by Austria 
on 
Main issues to be discussed at the IPCC-WGIII Workshop on New Emission Scenarios 
29 June – 1 July 2005, Laxenburg, Austria 
 
 
General comments 
Austria welcomes the opportunity to provide its views on relevant issues to be discussed at the 
workshop. Austria sees a strong need to start a process that results in new emission scenarios to be 
available for the fifth assessment report. However, Austria also feels that in the assessment report(s) a 
general description of the role of such emission scenarios and the identification of decisions of 
significant impact on future emissions should be included. Policy makers should not blame emission 
scenarios for resulting in unwanted (high) emissions but the (political) decisions that may contribute to 
such development. 
 
Specific comments 
Austria would like to put forward the following preliminary views with regard to the questions 
identified in the letter from 1 March. 
 
(i) What are your future needs with respect to new emission scenarios; to what extent have 
current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs? 
 
Austria expects that the fifth assessment report will build on new emission scenarios. All the 
new scenarios should be consistent with the most recent scenarios developed by other 
agencies, e.g. the IEA (energy scenarios), the UN (population scenarios). Austria does not 
expect probabilities for the new scenarios because it would be beyond the scope of the IPCC 
to try to assess the political will of stakeholders in the next 100 years. 
 
(ii) What kind of scenarios could meet your future needs and requirements? 
 
Future emission scenarios should reflect the full range of possible futures. There should be a 
range of  
1. business as usual scenarios  
2. of mitigation scenarios  
3. stabilization scenarios.  
The key factors that result in different emissions should be identified in order to better 
understand the world that is linked to each of those scenarios. Past IPCC scenarios did 
highlight some of the key parameters (e.g. population, energy consumption, energy split) but 
maybe not all – e.g. with regard to technology development (e.g. rate of market penetration, 
investments needed). It might also be helpful to split the global figures into regions in order 
to better assess the feasibility of the assumptions. For large countries (US, EU, China, India) 
even a country split might be appropriate. The methodological description should be 
provided as an annex and all background material should be made available, e.g. via a CD-
rom in order to allow for an in-depth review. It might be useful to develop a format to help 
such review process. Any assumptions made by the experts of the IPCC need to be made 
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transparent and justification of them should be included. The format of such justification 
(“expert judgement”) could build on the format required in preparation of emission 
inventories.  
 
 
(iii) What possible roles could IPCC play in the development of new scenarios, in light of the 
outcomes of the discussion on objectives (i) and (ii)?  
 
 
Future emission scenarios should be based on those published in peer reviewed literature. The 
IPCC will have to review those scenarios in order to check that all information to understand the 
scenarios is available, ask authors to provide missing information, start a process to get a full 
description of the scenario and bring those scenarios into a comparable format.  
 
However, if the scenarios, having been published in the peer reviewed literature, do not deliver all 
the scenarios identified under i) and ii) it is proposed that the IPCC organizes a process with the 
scientific community in developing in addition those that have not been published in the literature 
but should be made available to the 5th assessment report. 
 
If no team in the scientific community is willing to co-operate with the IPCC in developing the 
missing scenarios the IPCC should also have the mandate to develop new scenarios, as was the case 
with the IS92 and SRES scenarios. 
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Azerbaijan 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Submission on IPCC  Workshop on New Emissions Scenarios in Laxemburg, Austria, June 29-July 1 
2005. 
 
There is a need in Regional Emissions Scenarios. 
As Azerbaijan is situated in the join point of the existing models for Europe and Asia and there are 
some uncertainties in selecting in using those models. 
 
Considering the fact what economy of Azerbaijan has developed and chanced for last 10 years it would 
more useful and helpful to consider accelerating social-economic development in the country with 
transition economic like Azerbaijan. 
 
In the process of preparing the Initial National Communication not all the aspects of social-economical 
scenarios were used. In the nearest future we are planning to fulfill that point in the preparing Second 
National Communication. 
 
It would be useful to decision makers to have both the short and the long term perspectives in 
developing scenarios.  
 
The IPCC as an organ plays an important role in these issues. 
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Canada 
CANADA 
 
VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUTURE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
SCENARIOS 
 
As requested by the Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
Canada is pleased to submit its views on the second meeting on the development of 
emissions scenarios, a workshop to be held 29 June – 1 July, 2005 in Laxenburg, Austria.  
Canada welcomes the opportunity to present its views on the main issues to be discussed at 
the workshop by addressing the questions (in italics below) posed by Renate Christ, on behalf 
of the Chair of the IPCC. 
 
(i) What are your future needs with respect to new emission scenarios; to what extent have 
current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled 
those needs? 
 
Canada, and all countries, will need reliable, internationally consistent, comparable and 
detailed long-term scenarios of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations and emissions.  These 
will enhance our collective understanding of the global emissions picture, as well as support 
international discussions on energy and climate-change related matters.  In addition, they will 
almost surely be of use to Canada’s research and NGO communities. 
   
Previous scenarios—including the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)—have 
been found to be very useful within government and the research community.  In particular, 
senior government officials have looked to these scenarios in addressing issues related to 
stabilizing GHG emissions. 
 
To meet Canada’s upcoming modelling and analytical requirements, upcoming scenarios 
should have: 
 Key variables made explicit (regarding population, productivity, energy efficiency 
improvement, etc.) and comparable across scenarios.  The key variables should have 
some discussion of alternative parameter values, to provide a range or reveal 
differences of opinion where possible. 
 Sectoral detail for major GHG-emitting sectors (agriculture, oil and gas extraction, coal 
mining, electric power generation, non-hydro renewables, refineries, iron & steel, 
aluminum and/or other non-ferrous smelting, industrial chemicals, cement, glass, 
transportation, households). 
 Regional detail at an economically meaningful level—the SRES met this requirement. 
 Explicit discussion of prospective demand and technological futures under the various 
scenarios (e.g. travel demand per person, vehicle efficiencies, energy conversion 
efficiencies, etc.) where possible. 
 Regard for regional air quality issues, both in developing scenarios and in providing 
data on regional energy/non-GHG emissions where possible. 
 
(ii) What kind of scenarios could meet your future needs and requirements? 
 
Canada will need multiple scenarios, at least one consistent with aggressive GHG-mitigation 
policies (e.g. stabilization at various levels) and at least one consistent with less aggressive 
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policies.  Among other things, such scenarios allow Canada (and other countries) to 
understand the full implications and possible options available in regards to the various levels 
of effort required to move from current pathways to alternative. 
 
 
(iii) What possible roles could IPCC play in the development of new scenarios, in light of the 
outcomes of the discussion on objectives (i) 
and (ii)? Options may include: a. No specific role, other than assessing existing scenario 
literature, b. Organize a process with the scientific community in developing new scenarios 
(driven by the modelers), c. Develop new scenarios, as was the case with IS92 and SRES 
scenarios. 
 
Canada believes that the IPCC should lead the development of scenarios, using options b. or 
c. above.  While there are efforts currently undertaken elsewhere to generate scenarios, 
many of them are not mutually comparable, or involve different sets of assumptions or 
modelling frameworks that are not easily compared. 
 
The IPCC is particularly well placed to produce or organize the development of scenarios.  
Furthermore, the IPCC or IPCC officials have already engaged to various extents many of the 
authors who are or will be producing scenarios in the open literature.  This process of 
engagement should continue, keeping in mind that a transparent and open process becomes 
particularly important in addressing concerns about bias.  
 
In Canada’s view, the choice between options b. and c. should be guided by:  
 The ability to reflect simultaneously expert opinions on development, technology, 
scientific, economic and population issues. 
 Transparency and broad exposure, allowing for comments and review before final 
publication.  
 Timeliness, both in producing as current an outlook as possible, and in capturing as 
efficiently as possible the various authors’ contributions and views.  
 
A detailed, agreed-upon, and up-to-date set of scenarios would be of great value indeed.  
Differences of opinion can be reflected in the discussion of the various parameters and other 
assumptions that accompany the presentation of the scenarios. 
 
Canada looks forward to participating in upcoming events that contribute to the development 
of emissions scenarios. 
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Chile 
 
 
VIEWS OF CHILE ON THE IPCC WORKSHOP ON EMISSIONS SCENARIOS  
 
 
General Comment: 
 
Emissions Scenarios is an aggregated tool for the assessment of future scenarios. In general terms, for 
Latin American countries, emission scenarios currently defined are too global, and therefore they are 
not useful for policymakers to take decisions on environmental management.  
 
New efforts are needed in order to produce emissions scenarios that are suitable for decision making 
for countries of a small scale, in terns of their burden of emissions. If the present methodologies do not 
enable this kind of issue on emissions scenarios, at least some methodological features allowing 
particular countries to make deeper approaches on emissions scenarios, over the basis of scenarios 
given by IPCC are needed. 
 
Particular comments 
 
 
1. The Urbanization process is a very important one, especially in the developing world, including 
Latin America. There are important trends in developing countries, causing changes in patterns of 
general way of living. Little by little, people leaves farm-related jobs to establish themselves in 
cities, mainly in the suburbs. This trend will put important pressures on emissions, linked to land 
use, mobility patterns and energy consumption. These trends must be taken in account for the 
assessment of future scenarios. Additionally, energy consumption rates growth has proved quicker 
in developing countries than in OECD ones. This fact, and how these rates will evolve in the future, 
must be taken into account for future scenarios. 
2. Some changes on emissions are due to social and management modifications rather than 
technological ones. Urban planing systems or general transport frameworks in big cities, affecting 
the behavior of people, are good examples. There is a need to include in future scenarios such kind 
of changes where there are high possibilities of its application. Cases of implementation of 
Transmillenium transport project in Bogotá, Colombia, or Transantiago transport project, in 
Santiago, Chile, are good examples that, maybe in the next future, will be applied in other big cities 
of Latin America. 
3. In general terms, global emission scenarios are built upon emissions factors valid for developed 
countries. In the context of developing emission inventories, for both global and local pollutants, 
some developing countries have developed local factors, more representative of local conditions. 
These factors, when available, should be preferred for emissions in the developing world. An 
assessment of the suitability of using these factors must be done in order to improve future 
emissions scenarios. 
4. More efforts are needed to improve the spatial and temporal resolutions for definition of future 
scenarios. Countries should go further with their work in specific scenarios. Development of 
capabilities to build local scenarios is important to link the development of scenarios with decision 
making.  
5. There is a strong need to develop indicators that allow comparing different scenarios. Such 
indicators will be useful to advice policy makers in developing climate-oriented policies. 
  Annex III- 9 -  
6. New scenarios could include methodological features that allow particular countries to develop its 
own scenarios, upon the basis of the global ones. 
7. It would be desirable to develop an interactive system that allows countries to “put” its emissions 
inventories and scenarios, when available, in a global shared system. This system could enable a 
strong cooperation between countries and investigators on emission inventories and emission 
scenarios. 
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China 
 
China's views on the IPCC Workshop on New Emissions Scenarios 
 
According to the letter from the Secretary of the IPCC dated on 1 March 2005, we put forward the 
following views on the main issues to be discussed at the IPCC Workshop on New Emissions 
Scenarios. 
 
Generally speaking, the development of emission scenarios is a kind of very difficult and time-
exhausted effort with significant uncertainty. On the one hand, the current and past IPCC scenarios 
have reflected our understanding of climate change science and socio-economic situations. In 
particular, SRES was the wonderful work done by many distinguished scientists over the world. So far 
it hasn't been fullly utilized. We should continue to make good use of these scenarios. On the other 
hand, as time passes, many factors, especially socio-economic factors have changed a lot. The current 
and past scenarios are not enough for determining the dangerous level of climate change. Therefore, it 
is suggested to further improve current scenarios and gradually develop new emission scenarios after 
AR4. 
 
Considering the complexity and difficulties of the development of new emission scenarios, it is 
suggested that experts should begin to collect relevant information in order to develop more reasonable 
new scenarios. New emissions should consider special development needs of developing countries. In 
addition, due to unexpected technology advance, it is suggested new scenarios had better have smaller 
time frame.  
 
As regard to the possible role that IPCC could play, it is suggested that IPCC could organize a process 
with the scientific community in developing new scenarios. In this way, it could ensure more 
participants, more subjective, open and transparency. 
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Denmark 
 
IPCC Working Group III Technical Support Unit 
ipcc3tsu@rivm.nl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Climate and environmental support  
 
In your reply, please refer to File No. 
File no. M:  
Ref.:  
JGu/AJ 
 
Date April 11, 2005 
 
 
 
 
Concerning. Workshop on scenarios 29 June 1 july 2005 
 
 
Dear Sirs 
 
We appreciate the opportunity to submit our views on the 
future needs with respect to new emission scenarios. The 
Climate and Environmental Support unit of the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency is the key advisor to the 
Danish Government on issues related to climate policy. 
 
We have found the earlier scenario work of the Panel extremely useful. It 
simplifies the work of policy advisors to have a reasonable set of well 
reviewed and representative scenarios and creates coherence in the 
international work. The SRES scenarios have been run by several GCM-
model groups and also feeds further into regional models and work on 
impacts and adaptation.  
 
The most present need now is probably not to revise the SRES scenarios, 
but rather to have a review of stabilisation scenarios, ie scenarios which 
leads to stabilisation of the GHG-concentrations and of global climate, at 
various levels. We believe the effort should concentrate on scenarios that 
avoids dangerous levels, such as by staying below 2 degrees average 
global temperature compared to the preindustrial situation. For each level 
of stabilised climate change, it would be useful to have access to several 
scenarios, based on varying assumptions about the earth-system (climate 
sensitivity, Carbon-cycle etc) and based on various assumptions about 
technologies and socioeconomic and other driving factors. The scenarios 
should be explicit in terms of technologies, energy-sources end energy 
demand, and should have data for selected points in time such as 2020, 
2050 and 2100 and beyond and should be reasonably detailed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mljøministeriet 
Miljøstyrelsen 
Strandgade 29 
DK-1401 Copenhagen K 
Denmark 
 
Phone: +45 32 66 01 00 
Fax: +45 32 66 01 00 
Telex: 31209 miljoe dk  
mst@mst.dk 
www.mst.dk 
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geografically so that regions, or even countries, can study the scenarios and see their implications for 
the local development of infrastructure, energy systems etc. 
 
We believe the scenarios should be made by independent modeling groups, but the Panel should take 
on a coordinating role, such as specifying required output from the modelling, without which analysis 
and synthesis of results across models and scenarios would be difficult.  Also reporting of costs should 
be harmonized, so that comparison of costs implied by the various scenarios can be made, which could 
feed into the international discussion on how to achieve the ultimate objective of the convention in an 
economically efficient way. 
 
Policy-makers needs some reasonable explicit scenarios to get an idea of the changes in energy systems 
etc that are involved in achieving stabilisation. And as an input to the national and international 
discussion on policies that might effect those changes.  
 
We believe such scenarios would also be extremely useful for businesses with a stake in the future 
changing markets, such as energy suppliers, manufacturers of technologies, international investment 
and lending institutions etc. 
 
An idea that might be explored, is to involve local modelers in a coordinated global scenario-building 
exercise, such as was done under the WEC decades ago.  This kind of exercise would probably be too 
demanding for the IPCC to organize itself, but the Panel could invite other organisations to initiate such 
work. 
 
Besides being useful for policymaking in the mitigation area, the availability of credible, consistent 
stabilisation scenarios would also be very useful for the work on adaptation strategies, and 
considerations on the relation between adaptation and mitigation. Selection of a suitable set of 
“marker” stabilisation scenarios, for which also GCM-runs were made, would meet a need in such 
national work. 
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France 
PREMIER MINISTRE 
 
MINISTERE DE L’ECOLOGIE  ET DU DEVELOPPMENT DURABLE 
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Délégation interministérielle 
au développement durable 
 
Observatoire national sur les  
effets du réchauffement climatique 

Le Directeur 
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Germany 
 
German views on new Emission scenarios 
Referring to letter from Secretariat No. 7711-05/IPCC/WG3 March 2005 
The government of Germany welcomes the opportunity to express views on the issues to be discussed 
at the workshop on the development of new emission scenarios.  
General Comments 
Future needs with respect to new emission scenarios – to what extent have 
current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs? 
The development of IPCC emission scenarios has been useful in the past as a common basis for the 
analysis of possible climate change, its impacts, and options to mitigate climate change.  
 
The SRES scenarios (developed between 1996 and 2000) are now being used widely for climate 
change analyses, including impact analyses, as well as mitigation analyses, e.g. for the AR4. For the 
Fifth Assessment Report (to be published in 2012), there will be a need for new emission scenarios, 
based on an evaluation of the SRES scenarios and other scenarios in the literature, in the light of more 
recent analyses and observed trends in driving forces for emissions. 
 
As in the past (IS92a, SRES), it is useful to develop emission scenarios that assume no additional 
climate policy, as a basis to analyse the implications for climate change and its impacts of a 
development without any additional future climate policy and as a reference for the analysis of 
mitigation scenarios relevant for Art. 2 FCCC. In order to operationalise  Art. 2, there is a need to 
analyse the climate change implications and its impacts of different mitigation scenarios related to 
different levels of climate change.  Therefore, it would be useful to develop a range of mitigation 
scenarios in addition to these baseline scenarios.  
Scenarios that could meet future needs and requirements  
Germany thinks that a comprehensive review of the SRES scenarios and of other scenarios in the 
literature is necessary in order  to draw conclusions for the development of new scenarios. 
 
As the assessment in the IPCC AR4 of new literature since SRES will also cover literature on emission 
scenarios that include climate feedbacks, it would be useful to address this question at the Laxenburg 
workshop.  
 
The approach used in the SRES scenarios of looking at different possible development pathways 
(“storylines”) with consistent assumptions about different driving forces (population, economic 
development, technology development) is considered to be useful. The role of technology development 
and factors that drive technology development should be addressed in particular. 
Possible roles of the IPCC in the development of new scenarios 
The experience in the past shows that it is useful for the IPCC to develop new scenarios, as has been 
done in the past with IS92 and SRES scenarios. This is important to provide a set of common baseline 
scenarios both for climate modelling and impacts research as well as for the development of mitigation  
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scenarios to address questions related to Art. 2 FCCC, so that comparability of results of climate 
change, impacts, and mitigation scenarios is improved. The development should be  based on a 
thorough review and assessment of SRES scenarios as well as of scenarios developed since the 
publication of the SRES scenarios. Experience and expertise of practitioners with energy and emission 
scenarios should be taken into account appropriately.  
 
An open process for the development of the scenarios such as has been applied for the development of 
the SRES scenarios should be followed again, so that a wide range of scientific perspectives  and 
interactions between regions and sectors can be taken into account and input and feedback from a wide 
community of experts and practioners can be used.  
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Madagascar 
MADAGASCAR 
 
 
 
IPCC workshop on New Emissions Scenarios 
 
Nirivololona RAHOLIJAO 
Research Service 
National Meteorological Office 
 
 
 
In year 2002, Madagascar National Meteorological Office was in charge of the elaboration of 
the Climate Change Scenarios for Madagascar as part of the Vulnerability and Adaptation Study in the 
framework of the first national communication to UNFCCC. 
The climate scenarios were built from the climate scenarios generator software 
MAGICC/SCENGEN( Hulme,M. et al., 2000) which use as input nineteen pre-defined emission 
scenarios. Three emission scenarios were selected for this study: 
 
-two scenarios from the first scenarios developed by the IPCC, the IS92 scenarios: 
IS92a(reference scenario) and IS92c(policy scenario). 
-one scenario from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios, SRES(Nakicenovic et al, 
2000): SRES98a. 
 
Future changes in climate are based on model projections with these scenarios. Assumptions 
associated with emissions scenarios are one of the the source of uncertainties in future climate change. 
As emission scenarios user for vulnerability, impacts and adaptation assessment, we submit the 
following points of view: 
 
i) New emission scenarios should take into account more national (or at least regional) 
dimensions. Current and past IPCC scenarios approaches have not fulfilled these needs 
since they were produced for a global scale consideration. Impacts studies are 
undertaken at much finer spatial scale. 
 
ii) New emission scenarios should consider: 
 
• Regional/national population growth rate 
• Regional/national GDP growth rate 
• Regional/national climate policies and environmental policies 
• Regional/national observed GHG emissions trend 
• Short, medium and long-time projections 
• Climate initiatives such as the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Montreal Protocol 
 
             iii)    IPCC could organize a process with the scientific and socio-economic communities in 
developing new scenarios.
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Mexico 
 
Views from Mexico. 
 
Mexico has devoted great attention to the environment, reason by 
which the environmental item is one included in the Political Agenda. 
The Federal Government has asked the University Program of Energy to 
carry on a prospective study of scenarios of emissions to year 2030. 
 
The main activities were: 
 
Elaboration of summaries of the environmental in relation to the 
emissions by the energy sector. 
 
International evaluation of the present situation in the matter of 
emissions by the different economic sectors. 
 
In this last point the scenarios of the IPCC were analyzed which was 
of great relevance to de define carrying events and drivers of the 
future. 
 
Estimation of the parameters required by our model. 
 
We proposed three scenarios. 
 
We organized working groups to analyze the different scenarios and to 
retrofit the proposed scenarios. 
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The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands views on the main issues to be discussed in the IPCC Emissions 
Scenarios meeting to be held from 29 June – 1 July 2005 in Laxenburg, Austria 
 
The Netherlands is happy to submit its views on the IPCC Emissions Scenarios meeting in 
Laxenburg, Austria, as requested in your letter, reference: 7711-05/IPCC/WG3. The 
Netherlands also nominates experts from the different user communities to attend the 
meeting as requested. 
 
Your letter formulates three specific questions that we have used to structure this submission. 
 
(i) What are your future needs with respect to new emission scenarios; to what extent have 
current and past IPCC scenario approaches fulfilled those needs? 
(ii) What kind of scenarios could meet your future needs and requirements? 
 
These first two questions are answered jointly below. 
 
The Netherlands wishes to stress that emission scenarios should be as realistic as possible to 
be of practical use and to receive maximal acceptance. Greenhouse gas emissions are 
closely connected to the source and magnitude development in energy production in different 
parts of the world. Furthermore changes in greenhouse gas emissions stem from land use 
including forestry) that are subject to change in surface area and technology application. To 
assist integrated consideration of these land use policies, energy policies and climate change 
policies the Netherlands consider the development of closely linked or integrated scenarios of 
importance. In this respect future fuel prices merit more attention. Scenarios which integrate 
aspects of the supply of energy in the future (energy prices, oil, natural gas, coal) will possibly 
make climate policy more attractive. New scenarios for 2030 developed by IIASA indicate that 
the current IPCC emissions scenarios underestimate the effect of planned (or even already 
implemented) air pollution policy measures, which strongly reduce future emissions. Because 
climate and air quality are increasingly connected in policy making there is a need for 
consistent scenarios including different time horizons: 2030 (as this is the time horizon for air 
quality policy makers) as well as 2050 and 2100 (for climate policy). This includes the 
interaction between ozone depletion and climate change as indicated in IPCCs Special 
Report. 
 
Furthermore scenarios are desirable which show the effect of CO2 trade on trade balance 
and terms of trade, scenarios which show learning aspects of new technology and scenarios 
which integrate effects of climate change on world economy. 
 
Currently global and regional emissions scenarios co-exist. The IPCC emission scenarios are 
used primarily at an international level, whereas locally national and/or regional scenarios are 
being used (for example in European negotiations and national policy making). It is desirable 
to have available global scenarios that have sufficient detail to be applicable on a regional 
scale. At a European level this is attempted with the RAINS-model supplemented with 
greenhouse gases (GAINS). 
 
It would be worthwhile to attempt to attach probabilities to different scenarios, despite 
conceptual difficulties. 
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(iii) What possible roles could IPCC play in the development of new scenarios, in light of the 
outcomes of the discussion on objectives (i) and (ii)? 
 
One could argue that IPCC has no active role to play in developing emission scenarios. It is 
the task of the research community to independently develop scenarios out of scientific 
principles. IPCC merely assesses scientific knowledge on the basis of existing literature. 
However, from a practical viewpoint it is helpful if IPCC stimulates the development of sets of 
high quality scenarios so as to facilitate comparability of different model runs.   
 
IPCC could also play a role in improving consistency between emissions scenarios and 
efforts outside a strict climate context (e.g. IEA scenarios for future energy consumption), as 
well as with economic development (such as scenarios developed by WB, OECD and others).  
 
The Netherlands therefore sees no objection in IPCC developing scenarios provided this is 
being done in close collaboration with existing scientific organisations, notably WCRP, IGBP 
and IHDP. 
 
The Netherlands is pleased to nominate the following experts for contributing to the IPCC 
Emissions Scenarios meeting: 
 
Ms. E. Trines, independent expert 
Mr. J. Vis, representative Non Governmental Organizations 
Mr. E. Schmersal, Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment 
Mr. T. van Noije, Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute 
 
Brief curricula vitae of the nominees have been annexed to this submission. 
  Annex III- 24 -  
New Zealand 
 
The role of the IPCC in developing and assessing future emission scenarios 
 
The New Zealand government welcomes the invitation by the IPCC to provide its views on: 
• future needs with respect to new emission scenarios, and the extent to which current and past 
scenarios have met those needs, 
• the types of scenarios that would fulfil those needs, and  
• the role that the IPCC could play in the development of new scenarios. 
 
Future needs with respect to emission scenarios and extent to which current and past scenarios 
have met those needs, and the types of scenarios that would fulfil those needs 
 
Non-mitigation scenarios: Past and current non-mitigation scenarios have provided essential input to 
climate models to estimate a plausible range of future climate change to 2100 in the absence of targeted 
mitigation measures. Non-mitigation scenarios will continue to be essential information for 
governments, since they act as baselines against which governments can determine the climatic and 
socio-economic effect of mitigation policies and broader development goals. 
 
Stabilisation scenarios: Stabilisation scenarios have been useful mainly in providing a long-term view 
of the climate system, and to provide information on both the timing and magnitude of emission 
reductions that need to be undertaken to allow stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at various possible levels, consistent with Article 2 of the Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. Stabilisation scenarios, their long-term climatic implications and impacts and 
adaptation options, and the magnitude, costs and timing of mitigation measures, will continue to 
provide essential information for policymakers, and the information associated with stabilisation 
scenarios across all 3 IPCC Working Groups should be updated regularly. 
 
One shortcoming of stabilisation scenarios is that they have tended to focus on stabilisation of CO2 
only. This has led to confusion about the total radiative forcing associated with specific targets and the 
long-term climate effects, as well as the mitigation costs and timing. Future stabilisation scenarios 
should work with multi-gas approaches, and clearly link stabilisation concentrations to the radiative 
forcing exerted by the total mix of gases. 
 
Policy scenarios: A third class of scenarios is needed but has not received systematic treatment by the 
IPCC. These are ‘partial’ mitigation policy scenarios that are most reflective of the real world. Given 
the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the assumption of the SRES scenarios that no specific 
greenhouse gas mitigation action is taken is clearly no longer valid. 
 
Future scenario work by the IPCC should therefore include ‘partial mitigation’ scenarios that describe 
the effect of various policies that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions but that are not in themselves 
determined by a particular stabilisation goal. An assessment of such partial policy scenarios would be 
essential for policymakers to understand the relative climatic effect, avoided damages, costs, 
technology and timing options, and implications for sustainable development for a range of regional 
and sectoral mitigation approaches. 
 
  Annex III- 25 -  
The development and assessment of scenarios that evaluate the effect of specific policy approaches 
would be best to be comprehensive and inclusive of a wide range of approaches being discussed in the 
academic literature. 
 
The role of the IPCC in developing future scenarios 
 
Over the last two years there have been questions raised by expert commentators about aspects of some 
of the economic methodologies underlying the IPCC projections.  In assessing future scenarios, the 
IPCC should take explicit note of economic methodologies used in their production. New Zealand 
encourages the IPCC to review the widest possible range of comments on scenarios produced in the 
expert literature. This would include taking note of comments made by institutions such as the 
Economics Department of the OECD. 
 
A disproportionate amount of recent media attention on emission scenarios has focused on supposed 
discrepancies in economic metrics and assumptions used in producing scenarios. A robust IPCC-
organised discussion on the proper choice of economic metrics and the proper explanation of economic 
assumptions would be beneficial to the future production of scenarios. Such a discussion would be 
strengthened by the participation of a broad range of economics, policy, and development climate 
change experts. 
 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: We consider it important that the IPCC produce a Special 
Report on Emission Scenarios, based on an assessment of the available literature, to provide guidance 
to the authors of the 5th Assessment Report. Such a Special Report would need to be started with very 
high priority in the next assessment cycle to ensure its results are available to the authors before the end 
of 2010. Failure by the IPCC to provide consistent and timely guidance on emission scenarios would 
likely lead to inconsistencies in the contributions of the three Working Groups to the 5th Assessment 
Report. 
 
Non-mitigation scenarios: We believe the IPCC remains an essential body to assess available scenario 
literature with regard to non-mitigation scenarios, and to ensure that underlying assumptions are 
subjected to expert scrutiny and are made transparent. To ensure this goal can be achieved, it may be 
important for an IPCC expert meeting to clearly set out the parameters and assumptions that individual 
scenarios need to provide information on so that they can be consistently assessed and compared with 
each other.  
 
We do not see benefit in the IPCC either becoming involved in a prescriptive approach to developing 
new non-mitigation scenario literature by external groups, or to develop new scenarios itself. 
 
Stabilisation scenarios: With regard to stabilisation scenarios, the IPCC should produce clear guidance 
to modelling groups about the relevant relationships between radiative forcing, lifetimes of greenhouse 
gases, and atmospheric concentrations, to achieve a consistent metric for comparison of different 
stabilisation scenarios and the mix of greenhouse gas concentrations. As long as a wide range of 
possible stabilisation targets is maintained (e.g. from 450 to 1000ppm CO2-equivalent), this approach 
would not be policy-prescriptive even if the information required would be prescriptive for individual 
modelling groups. We do not see benefit in the IPCC developing its own stabilisation scenarios. 
 
Partial policy scenarios: One of the most important and challenging tasks for the IPCC will be the 
development and assessment of partial or transitional scenarios as suggested above, that is, scenarios 
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that apply mitigation policies only at the regional or sectoral level and that are not determined in 
themselves to achieve stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations. 
 
To this end, the IPCC should undertake a stocktake through a series of expert meetings, of the current 
policy scenarios available in the literature, and group those scenarios into a limited number of 
approaches. The scenarios under each of those approaches could then be evaluated for their likely 
effects on: 
• global climate system in the near and long term,  
• avoided damages from the impacts of climate change,  
• mitigation technology options 
• timing of mitigation and implications for long-term greenhouse gas concentrations 
• mitigation costs 
• co-benefits and integration with sustainable development objectives. 
 
We suggest that a Special Report by the IPCC on such a set of mitigation policies would be very 
helpful for governments and policymakers. Governments would need to determine the total scope of 
the report and against which criteria the various policy sets are evaluated, but it would be essential that 
the scenarios are inclusive of a wide range of hypothetical options to ensure the IPCC does not 
prejudge the interests of the policy community. 
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Panama 
 
Submission of views from Panama; 
 
We are grateful to the IPCC for the objective and comprehensive assessment of social and economical 
information on climate change research and mitigation and adaptation measurements. Nevertheless, the 
emissions and concentrations of GHGs and aerosols as well as the response of climatic system are 
subject of the very high level of uncertainty. 
 
Moreover there are certain antagonisms in the methodology when at the very high uncertainty of the 
assessments the determinative methods are used. In this respect, it is much more correct to be 
consecutive and wider apply the probabilistic approaches. It is particularly important for long-term 
perspective of events developments. On our opinion, it will reflect the modern level of understanding 
of climatic events development. 
 
We also consider that the IPCC could follow the way of assessments integrations where all the 
interaction aspects can be taken into consideration instead of following the way of increasing the 
options of events developments, which have no deficiencies.  
 
The aim is to reduce the uncertainties of existing assessments. 
 
In this aspect there would be of interest the assessments considering both social-economic and natural 
factors, which are the certain phase of GHGs concentration increase can play a decisive role (e.g. the 
world ocean). 
 
Effective also could be established of appropriate working groups of experts, the practice of which in 
our opinion proved to correct and is extremely effective. 
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Sweden 
 
Sweden 
 
Issues that could be discussed: 
  
Underlying assumptions regarding the pace and distribution of development, specially 
technical and economic development. We would like to see more in depth elaboration 
on emissions on sulphur, soot, particles etc. how the development looks like for every 
single subject. 
Specified stabilisation scenarios. Emission scenarios has to be coupled to the carbon 
cycle, the sulphur cycle etc. We need more information on the relation between 
emissions, atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and the relation to 
temperature. The uncertainty in vulnerability – we would need the information where 
the lowest limit is for an impact/event to happen. 
We would like to see the IPCC as a free and assessing body. However, if IPCC could 
initiate a process where the scientific community takes on the work in close 
collaboration with stakeholders dealing with emission reporting an prognosis, without 
scarifying its integrity, that would be a way forward. 
  
Best regards 
  
Marianne Lilliesköld 
Swedish IPCC Focal Point 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
Research Secretariat 
SE 106 48 Stockholm 
Phone: + 46 8 698 12 69 
Fax: + 46 8 698 16 64 
www.naturvardsverket.se 
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TGICA 
 
 
TGICA Submission on IPCC Scenarios Workshop 
IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria, June 29 – July 1 2005 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Task Group on Data and Scenario Support for Impacts and Climate Analysis (TGICA) was 
established by the IPCC in 1996 to facilitate wide availability of climate change related data and 
scenarios to enable research and sharing of information across the three IPCC working groups. This 
includes, for example, information on: anthropogenic influences on climate; climatological baselines 
and observations; emissions scenarios; climate scenarios; and information and scenarios on other 
environmental, technological, and socio-economic factors relevant to impacts, adaptation, vulnerability, 
and mitigation research. The TGICA coordinates a Data Distribution Centre (DDC) which provides 
these and other materials (e.g., technical guidelines on use of scenarios). The Group also identifies 
information needs in support of IPCC work, facilitates research on climate impacts, adaptation, and 
mitigation, and makes related recommendations on cross-cutting issues. The TGICA is composed of 
approximately 20 members known through their peer reviewed publications and works from the 
following areas of research: climatology; climate modeling (both global and regional); physical, social, 
and economic impacts; adaptation; emissions modeling; and integrated assessment. 
 
This submission was prepared in response to the letter requesting input from the IPCC Secretary. It was 
drafted during the 10th Meeting of the TGICA, in Sao Paolo, Brazil from 19- 21 April 2005 (see 
attached participant list). It addresses the first two issues on which input was requested, namely needs 
and requirements of (potential) user communities, and characteristics of scenarios that could meet those 
requirements. In offering these comments, TGICA draws upon its experience of interacting with 
researchers and analysts who use scenarios and related information in their research, as well as lead 
authors who apply scenarios in the process of preparing contributions to IPCC assessments. We do not 
address the third issue raised in the request for submissions, the possible future roles IPCC could play 
in the development of scenarios. 
 
2. Past use of scenarios 
 
TGICA has observed the important role that scenarios have played in previous IPCC assessments, and 
more broadly in research on climate change, its impacts, and response options. Specifically, past sets of 
IPCC scenarios have: 
 
• Provided a framework for IPCC WGs to put their assessments in a joint perspective, e.g. 
impacts consistent with climate change; climate change consistent with socioeconomic drivers; 
vulnerability and adaptation consistent with socio-economic drivers; land-use and land-use 
change consistent with emissions and mitigation on the one hand, and impacts, adaptation, and 
vulnerability on the other.
TGICA Input to Emission Scenario Workshop 21 April 2005 
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• Provided a mechanism by which WGs can coordinate their treatment of cross cutting issues and 
other linkages. 
• Encouraged comparability of studies for assessment by the IPCC by providing a framework of 
common assumptions around which independent researchers can voluntarily and informally 
coordinate their work. 
 
It bears emphasizing that these multiple uses (and integrating across them) are best supported if 
scenario development is approached as more than preparation of emissions scenarios, but as 
development of scenarios that also support projection of climate change and analysis of impacts, 
adaptation, and mitigation at different scales. It is important to keep all of these analytic, research, and 
assessment purposes in mind when scenarios are developed, or it is likely that important information 
requirements will not be met. 
 
Below we reflect on the lessons learned in assisting the IPCC community. This includes issues where 
discussion continues, as well as identification of needs and requirements crucial for successful scenario 
development and analysis. 
 
3. Unresolved issues 
 
The use of earlier sets of IPCC scenarios has met with several persistent issues that call for serious 
consideration in any future scenario exercise: 
• Specificity of storyline and derived assumptions 
• Connectivity to smaller scales 
• The use of scenarios to manage uncertainty 
 
Specificity. There is a tradeoff between specificity and the ease with which agreement can be reached 
on the plausibility of a scenario. With higher levels of specificity, it becomes easier for user groups to 
undertake in-depth analyses. Thus some analysts would prefer if a certain scenario specified the 
existence of an international agreement on emissions limitations that is enforced from a certain year 
onwards. But the more specific the chain of events in a scenario, the more likely it is that users will 
disagree about the plausibility of that chain of events. More generic storylines that don’t describe 
specific developments but that indicate “ high-levels of co-operation on environmental issues”  are easier 
to agree on and provide analysts flexibility in making their own detailed assumptions, but at a cost of 
developing comparable analysis without additional coordination. 
 
Connectivity to smaller scales. This issue has two components: what kind of quantitative information 
can be provided and the scale at which the information is provided. Over time, TGICA has experienced 
that many questions and problems arise when users of global scenario information wish to nest smaller 
scale analyses within the larger scale scenario in a consistent fashion. For analysis at smaller scales, it 
is highly desirable to have quantitative information on the background scenarios. Needs and 
requirements for this purpose include:  
• Multiple baselines to test robustness of policy alternatives 
• Information on the international policy environment, e.g. agreements on trade, 
• international environmental treaties and conventions 
• Land-use and land-use change scenarios including markets for land-based mitigation 
• options (bio-energy, C-plantations) 
• International markets for fossils fuels, metals, etc. 
• Technology, e.g. mitigation technology development: performance, cost, potentials 
• (e.g. solar, hydrogen, carbon sequestration and storage) 
TGICA Input to Emission Scenario Workshop 21 April 2005 
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However, this information is often required at a level of precision and/or geographic scale that is finer 
than the integrated assessment tools used to develop the global scenarios can credibly 
provide. 
 
Uncertainty. The tension between individual realizations associated with a storyline and probabilistic 
approaches to arrive at a best guess and a distribution around it has led to extensive and an as yet 
unresolved debate. In particular, the debate centers around whether to assign likelihoods to “ what-if”  
scenarios that fall within a range framed by a distribution of emissions. The TGICA has developed a 
proposal that aims to take on that discussion for consideration in future work that may be useful 
regardless of what decision is taken on the TGICA Input to IPCC Scenario Workshop 21 April 2005 
role of IPCC in development of future scenarios. This proposal is described in the last section of this 
document. 
 
4. Needs and requirements 
 
The needs and requirements for future work on scenarios are structured in a chain linking driving 
forces, emissions, climate change, impacts-adaptation-vulnerability, and integration. 
 
4.1 Socio-economic scenarios and emissions 
• Scenarios should identify coherent sets of drivers of emissions: population, GDP, energy use, 
land-use, technology, governance, trade, resources (fossil fuels, metals) and other factors. 
• The storyline/quantification practice developed within SRES, preceded by and adopted by other 
similar global assessments (Shell, UNEP-GEO, MA) has proven valuable and should be 
retained in future work. 
• Emissions trajectories should provide full coverage of sources, sectors, gases, regions (GHGs, 
pollutants, aerosols, ozone precursors, etc.) for evaluation by climate models. The trajectories 
should also include “ reference”  baselines as well as intervention scenarios. 
 
4.2 Scenarios for climate simulation 
 
• In order to facilitate intercomparison and diagnosis of climate model development, any new 
scenario set should include at least one scenario that has the equivalent forcing of a scenario in 
the previous set (at least as well mixed GHGs are concerned). 
• Emissions scenarios should include cases which lead to a sufficiently high signal-tonoise ratio 
in the climate models. 
• Multiple emissions scenarios for climate simulations should be sufficiently different to yield 
different outcomes from the simulation. 
• The representation of the reactive gases and local air pollutants needs to be improved. 
• Geographic distribution of short-lived gases is required as input. 
 
4.3 Impacts-adaptation-vulnerability 
 
• Extended storylines should provide qualitative detail to facilitate regional, country and local 
analysis of sensitivity, adaptive capacity, and vulnerability. 
• Global-scale scenarios should be constructed to support downscaling (at country, region and 
grid scale) of population, GDP, and other scenario characteristics affecting adaptive capacity 
and vulnerability, as well as development of consistent scenarios of land-use (agriculture, 
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timber, biomass, C-plantations) local pollutants, and downscaled climate (core variables, 
extremes, variability). 
• A traceable account of how global scenario information is aggregated should be carefully 
maintained so that the information can be accurately disaggregated again for 
impacts/vulnerability analysis. 
• Climate scenarios constructed from climate models data should include trends in means, 
changes in variability and extreme events, and abrupt and irreversible changes. Appropriate sets 
of indicators and formats should be developed through cooperation between the impacts and 
climate modeling communities. 
 
4.4 Integration across research and user communities 
To integrate across the research communities and provide information required by user communities 
that will in turn generate input for assessment by the IPCC, any efforts to develop scenarios for use 
after AR4 should encompass: 
• A set (or multiple sets) of consistent scenarios, rooted in storylines/narratives and providing 
input and background for assessments at smaller scale levels 
• Active involvement of representatives of user communities throughout the scenario 
development process to enhance commitment and acceptance 
• An open process to solicit input, comments and feedback from the broader research and user 
communities 
• Suitable (IA) model frameworks with adequate LULUCF functionality 
• Extensions beyond SRES (revisions/updates, downscaling, additional indicators and 
information) 
• The issue of uncertainty management (see proposal below) 
 
5. Proposal for evaluation of uncertainty in the scenario literature 
 
Whatever decision is reached about whether the IPCC will develop new scenarios, a useful first step 
activity (conducted as an antecedent to a scenario development process) is a thoughtful statistical 
analysis of two classes of scenarios: 1) reference cases; and 2) stabilization cases. 
 
What is meant by “ reference case”  would need to be carefully defined in light of the entry into force of 
the Kyoto Protocol, but the general sense of this term is scenarios that are constructed to illustrate what 
might happen in the event that (additional) climate policies are not undertaken. The analysis would 
include characterization of the frequency distribution of different emissions and concentration levels 
which capture some fraction (e.g., 2/3) of the range in the published literature. Perhaps even more 
important, this would also include analysis of distributions of important input/driving variables. The 
result of the exercise would be a careful description of the frequency distribution of the future range in 
emissions and concentrations with an analysis of the distribution of leading driving forces that could be 
used as a baseline characterization for a variety of analytical (and potentially decision making) 
purposes. 
 
The evaluation of concentration stabilization cases would be organized by stabilization level, e.g., 350, 
550, 750, etc. Just as for the reference cases, there are a number of definitional issues to be addressed 
carefully (e.g., what is being stabilized in multi-gas scenarios, what to do about aerosols, etc.) for the 
work to be meaningful. For each agreed level, the process would report on the frequency distributions 
of input assumptions for key variables that produce the stabilization level. This could include 
characteristics of technologies assumed in the scenarios, as well as demographic, economic, and other 
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characteristics. The result of this activity would be rigorous analysis of distributions of key input 
parameters for each stabilization level that would help illuminate the issues associated with attaining 
these different stabilization levels and that could serve as baselines for additional analysis. 
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United Kingdom 
 
UK submission on IPCC Emission Scenarios 
 
Future needs with respect to new emission scenarios and the extent to which current and 
past IPCC scenarios have fulfilled the needs of Governments 
 
Summary 
A range of scenarios and approaches is required to meet the needs of governments. An 
ability to distinguish between business as usual and with policy scenarios will be important. 
Some indication of likelihood is also essential. Stabilisation scenarios will be needed, together 
with an indication of options to achieve them. IPCC  should initiate a facilitative process with 
other organisations through which new scenarios are developed. IPCC’s primary role should 
be to act as an assessment body and to ensure consistency in the scenario development 
process.  
 
1. The needs of governments 
Governments in general need scenarios that will help them to assess the risks and costs of 
climate change, the effects of mitigation and adaptation policies on these risks and costs, and 
the options for mitigation and adaptation and their related costs. They need clarity in 
underlying assumptions and uncertainties, and a coherent and comprehensive approach to 
scenario development that recognises the practical needs of governments.   
 
2. Scope of the scenarios 
The IPCC should consider a wide range of scenarios and approaches to scenario building. 
This should range from the traditional “what if” approaches to more probabilistic methods. A 
clear distinction between interventionist and non-interventionist scenarios will be essential to 
inform the debate concerning the impact of policies on the response to climate change, and it 
should be very clear how interventionist and non-interventionist scenarios differ from and 
relate to one another. The set of scenarios should also include a group that defines pathways 
to greenhouse gas stabilisation at different levels.  
 
All scenarios should be accompanied by a full consideration of underlying assumptions and 
derived quantities of interests, including estimates of costs and benefits. Consideration of 
options and associated costs for achieving interventionist scenarios should be provided. 
 
To help in risk assessment Governments need some indication of the likelihood of different 
scenarios, particularly with regard to the set without policy intervention. It will be important to 
explore different ways of expressing and computing probabilistic scenarios, but a consistent 
approach will be essential, with clear links to underlying drivers such as population, economic 
growth and technology dynamics.  
 
3. Practical needs 
The ways in which scenarios are currently used should influence development of the next set. 
In practical terms it would be good to identify a few “marker” scenarios that would be widely 
used by GCM and impacts modellers and provide baselines for intercomparisons. This would 
reflect current experience in which  users take one or two scenarios from the SRES and use 
those as illustrative cases, rather than using all the scenarios. Given this, it may be useful to 
identify which two or three scenarios are likely to be most commonly used, for instance, 
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scenarios demonstrating typical high and low growth. In a probabilistic approach these could 
for example be 5 and 95 percentile scenarios. Additionally It would be useful to set a marker 
stabilisation target for the mitigation scenarios (such as 550ppm CO2 equivalent). 
 
4. Factors to be included in scenarios  
Scenarios will need to incorporate a comprehensive treatment of influences on climate. This 
will include analysis of greenhouse gases, aerosol,  tropospheric and stratospheric ozone pre-
cursors, natural emissions, and land use changes, as well as sinks and corresponding 
emissions.  
 
The socio-economic assumptions underlying the scenarios will need careful consideration. 
The socio-economic assumptions in particular should be carefully justified and consistently 
applied, ensuring a coherent and authoritative approach that commands widespread support 
among economists.  The differences between total costs of BAU and mitigation scenarios 
should be clearly defined.  
 
The impacts of both natural and socio-economic feedbacks will need to be addressed. Some 
socio-economic feedbacks and direct climate feedbacks could perhaps be complicated to 
include in scenarios, but do require some consideration due to their potentially significant 
impact on emissions (for instance of methane from hydrates).  
 
5. Timescales 
There is some need for the new scenarios to cover different time-scales; the 2100 end date is 
still relevant for many cases, but longer term scenarios would also provide useful information, 
particularly for stabilisation pathways. In addition, improved model intercomparisons would be 
enabled if scenarios with longer timescales are available, halting the current practice of 
extrapolating the scenarios beyond 2100 in various ways and inhibiting comparison of like 
with like beyond that date.  
 
New scenarios will of course need to be consistent with historical emissions, and it would be 
useful to consider historical emissions from as early a date as practically possible, for 
instance the early 1900s. There will need to be some measure of continuity with the existing 
SRES scenarios to ensure that new analyses can build on work that has been performed so 
far.  
 
6. Output 
Previous scenarios provided only limited information on regional scales, which would be 
valuable when considering the impacts of aerosol in particular. Therefore it would be 
advantageous if future scenarios could provide greater regional disaggregation of emissions 
and other output.  
 
On logistics, the output of the scenarios should be appropriate for application in driving 
GCMs, and governments would certainly find it useful if a database of relevant outputs could 
be provided for easy application of the associated information in a policy context. 
 
7. Role of IPCC in developing scenarios 
The primary role of the IPCC should be to ensure consistency in the scenarios, without being 
prescriptive, and to make sure that the end result is a common set of emission scenario 
information. In view of these objectives IPCC  should initiate a facilitative process with other 
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organisations through which new scenarios are developed. The IPCC should then be active in 
contributing to that process in terms of ensuring coherence and consistency. Scenario 
development will be most successful if user needs are provided as input on a regular basis. 
The IPCC is well placed to do this by ensuring that the scientists are guided by a body that 
has an overview of requirements.  The details of the involvement of the IPCC will require 
further elaboration but should be motivated by considerations such as these.  
 
8. Timing 
The IPCC should make every effort to agree the scenarios in time to ensure their availability 
in time for use in the Fifth Assessment Report. This suggests the need to prepare a special 
report on scenarios by about 2009/10. Optimal timing will need to be considered: premature 
development of scenarios could undermine the AR4 but an extended delay could prevent 
sufficient opportunities for new model studies to use the new scenarios prior to the AR5.  
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United States of America 
United States Government views on the main issues to be discussed at the IPCC Emission 
Scenarios Workshop in Laxenburg, Austria, 29 June - 1 July 2005. 
1. The United States Government believes that scenarios have played and will continue to play an 
important role as a framework for discussion of the potential impacts, costs, and policy choices related 
to greenhouse gas emissions and changes to the radiative balance of the atmosphere. They are 
important as research tools for testing ideas and as comparison tools for projecting the consequences of 
different socio-economic and development assumptions, technological advancements, or possible 
courses of action into alternative sets of future conditions.  Scenarios also are useful in gaining an 
understanding of the range of scientific uncertainties in the climate system and for helping to prioritize 
which are most important.  Because the relevant timescale for emissions scenarios is so long, their 
outputs are inherently uncertain.  Scenarios are best used for bounding problems and generating policy insights 
rather than prescribing particular solutions.  
Therefore, to be most useful scenarios should be: (1) updated, as needed, to incorporate the best available initial 
conditions, the most recent economic, population, technological data, and the latest developments in scenario 
modeling; (2) designed to address pressing climate change issues and provide insights to researchers and 
policymakers; and (3) well tested and documented, so as to improve user understanding of driving forces and 
uncertainties, distinguishing between questions that can be resolved over time and those that will remain 
unknowable for decades or more.   
 
2. Users of scenarios can be found in all segments of the U.S. science, technology, and policy community. What 
this vast and differentiated community will need or require in the future is best defined by the demands of the 
community itself.  Their needs and requirements will drive model and scenario development in the directions 
that are most productive.  For example, the Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum has organized an 
international scenario study group with the objective of developing new climate stabilization scenarios to meet 
the needs of the broader climate analytic community.  The U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) is 
another example of a scenario development process that includes many segments of the climate analytic 
community supported by the United States Government.  The final EMF and CCSP scenario products will be 
available for assessment by the time of the AR5 as will other scenario development efforts not formally 
associated with the IPCC.  The United States Government does not believe that an IPCC-led effort to direct the 
work of the modelers towards any specific scenario types, defined development pathways, or modeling 
methodologies would improve on the dynamic of the marketplace.  
 
The United States Government expects that useful new scenarios will be structured around two main areas: (1) 
reference or “ business-as-usual”  scenarios; and (2) stabilization scenarios.  In each area, it will continue to be 
important to evaluate the possible future range of emissions, climate change, and impacts from both a 
probabilistic and a deterministic or “ storyline”  perspective.   
Both reference and stabilization scenarios should take advantage of the latest data and model developments, 
including updated cost and performance information on mitigation technologies.  In addition, since the SRES, 
there have been many important developments in scenario work in the areas of non-CO2 GHGs, land use and 
forestry emission and sinks, and emissions of radiatively important non-GHGs such as black and organic carbon, 
and analysis of uncertainty, among other issues.  For comparison, reference and stabilization scenarios should be 
characterized in terms of population trajectories, economic growth by sector, primary energy contributions, land-
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use and land-use change, key technological changes affecting those, and the resulting emissions trajectories over 
time.  
 
New reference scenarios would help to show the range of emissions and potential climate change given the 
assumption of no specific greenhouse gas control policies and representing plausible values for critical drivers 
such as global population growth, technological change, and economic growth.  New stabilization scenarios 
would then be needed to span a range of GHG  concentrations and temperature change above pre-industrial 
levels.  It is important that objectives in these scenarios be defined in terms of metrics that allow for cost-
effective tradeoffs between GHGs. 
 
3. The United States Government believes that IPCC should have no specific role in commissioning or directing 
scenario development. While it may have been important a decade ago for IPCC to organize and seed the work 
that ultimately led to the scenario assessments described in the TAR, the community engaged in scenario 
development is now much larger and is attracting specialists from fields outside of the core IPCC disciplines that 
are needed to improve the soundness of the models. This is clearly evident from community modeling efforts 
such as the ENSEMBLES Project and the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project in Europe, the Asian-Pacific 
Integrated Modeling consortia coordinated by the National Institute of Environmental Studies in Japan, and the 
Energy Modeling Forum organized by Stanford University, as well as the multitude of original scenarios 
generated and published in the scientific literature that is not part of any IPCC-organized process.   
Future IPCC assessment activities should work with this community in the same way that they have worked with 
climate scientists in the past: engage the best people that the field has to offer as authors and reviewers of the 
state of the science.  The IPCC also should follow for AR5 the current experience of AR4 where IPCC authors 
are in the process of assessing the available literature published after the development and publication 
of the SRES.  IPCC should not try to push the field in any pre-determined direction.    
Beyond its assessment responsibilities, the IPCC could play an important but limited role in support of 
the modeling community’s effort to develop new scenarios by AR5.  To be more specific, the IPCC 
could:  
1. Prepare a Technical Paper evaluating the needs and requirements of governments, scientists, 
industry, and NGOs in assessing potential climate change with respect to new emission scenarios; 
2. Organize a Workshop or Expert Meeting to solicit input from governments, scientists, industry, and 
NGOs on their needs and useful approaches for scenario development prior to the start any major 
new scenarios development activities. 
3. Organize Workshops or Expert Meetings to help foster communication between and coordination 
across user and developer groups in ongoing scenarios modeling efforts.  IPCC involvement in 
these meetings might be especially useful to gain support for the participation of experts from 
developing countries.   
4. Provide simple guidance and formats for researchers to facilitate clear reporting of results and key 
assumptions that could aid in assessments in the future.  This guidance should not be prescriptive of 
methods and should be entirely voluntary for potential users.  
5. During the assessment of the scenario literature that is conducted as part of the AR5, perform 
statistical analysis of scenarios in the literature and describe the range of emissions for both 
reference and stabilization scenarios. This should include analysis of the major sources of variance 
across scenarios.  
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For all of the above options, the United States Government believes that the IPCC should not develop 
new scenarios, as was the case with the 1990, IS92 and SRES scenarios, but may support a process 
with the scientific community in the development of new scenarios that is driven by science itself. The 
post-SRES experience clearly demonstrates that: (1) the international modeling community is 
sufficiently capable of developing high-quality and state-of-the art scenarios on its own; (2) the current 
role of the IPCC in AR4 –of solely assessing the scenario literature– is proving effective; and (3) there 
is no evidence that the needs and requirements of governments, scientists, industry, NGOs, and the 
IPCC are not being met by scenario development efforts that are independent of the IPCC. 
 
 
  Annex III- 41 -  
Uzbekistan 
 
FAX 5 April 2005 
 
Subject: Submission of Uzbekistan of views of the main issues of IPCC workshop on new emission 
scenarios 29 June – 1 July 2005, Laxenburg, Austria 
 
(i) Objective 1 
 
The development of emission scenarios for 2010 – 2020 
 
(ii) Objective 2 
 
The regionally, econopmically or sectorally disaggregated scenarios with identification of main factors 
impacted to relevant sectors 
 
(iii) Objective 3 
 
The development of new scenarios as was done with IPCC IS92 and IPCC SRES scenarios with 
assessment of trust worthy for 2010 – 2020. 
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Worldbank  
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
As a follow up to Ms. Laura Tlaiyes' letter to Dr. Renate Christ, dated April 
21, 2005, regarding our views on the main issues to be discussed in Austria in 
late June, we have the following input to report: 
 
The World Bank is mostly interested in how energy markets may evolve in 
developing  countries, how energy technologies (production and use) may evolve,  
including their costs, the implications of developing countries assuming carbon 
emissions reductions obligations, and how the carbon market may evolve. 
 
Therefore, the IPCC new scenarios need to take into account revised population 
projections, the storyline team should have more financial experts, and the most 
useful scenarios are those that incorporate different climate policy assumptions 
(both OECD and developing countries) - different assumptions should be made 
regarding the evolution of different energy technologies (e.g., carbon cature 
and storage) and the international carbon market.   In addition, the storylines 
should NOT be written by the modellers, rather by a group of development and 
energy experts who are not confined by what can be modelled. 
 
We hope you find this information useful. Please let us know of any questions. 
 
Best, 
 
Elisson 
202-473-1067 
 
 
 
         
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE           
 
              WMO
                                
UNEP 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 
Annex IV- 1 - 
Annex IV 
 
IPCC WORKSHOP ON NEW EMISSION SCENARIOS 
29 June – 1 July 2005 
 
List of participants 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Anthony Adegbulugbe 
Centre for Enegy Research and Development 
Nigeria 
 
Mr. Aysar Ahmed Al-Tayeb 
Environmental Consultant 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Mr. Michail Antonovskyi 
Institute for Global Climate and Ecology 
Russia 
 
Mr. Mustafa Babiker 
Arab Planning Institute Kuwait 
 
Mr. Philip Bagnoli 
OECD 
France 
 
Mr. Jiri Balajka 
ECOSYS 
Slovak Republic 
 
Mr. Brad Bass 
Adaptation and Impacts Research Group 
Meteorological Service of Canada 
Canada 
 
Mr. Gerardo Bazan Navarette 
National Autonomous University  of Mexico 
(UNAM) 
Mexico 
 
 
Ms. Outi Berghäll 
Ministry of the Environment 
Finland 
 
Mr. Ulrich Berner 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour 
Germany 
 
Mr. Pierre Boileau 
Environment Canada 
Canada 
 
Mr. Bert Bolin 
Chairman Emeritus of the IPCC 
Sweden 
 
Mr. Prithiviraj Booneeady 
Mauritius Meteorological Service 
Mauritius 
 
Mr. Richard Bradley 
IEA/OECD 
France 
 
Mr. Eduardo Calvo 
IRENA 
Peru 
 
Mr. Ian Carruthers 
Australian Greenhouse Office 
Australia 
 
 
 
         
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE           
 
              WMO
                                
UNEP 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 
Annex IV- 2 - 
Mr. Tim Carter 
Finnish Environment Institute (SKYE) 
Finland 
 
Ms. Wenying Chen 
Tsinghua University, Beijing 
China 
 
Ms. Renate Christ 
Secretary of IPCC 
IPCC 
 
Ms. Laura Cozzi 
IEA 
France 
 
Mr. Ogun Davidson 
Co-chair WGIII 
IPCC-WGIII 
 
Mr. Mauro Meirelles de O. Santos 
Ministry of Science and Technology - MCT 
Brazil 
 
Mr. Francisco Delachesnaye 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
USA 
 
Ms. Nicole Dellero 
ICC 
France 
 
Mr. James Edmonds 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
USA 
 
Mr. Brian Fisher 
Australian Bureau of Agricultural  
  and Resource Economics 
Australia 
 
Mr. Brian Flannery 
Exxon Mobil Corporation 
USA 
 
Mr. Ronald Flipphi 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning  
  and the Environment 
Netherlands 
 
Mr Gilberto Gallopin 
Regional Adviser on Environmental Policies 
Division of Environment and Human Settlements 
United Nations 
Chile 
 
Mr. Javier García 
Environmental National Commission 
Chile 
 
Mr. Amit Garg 
UNEP-Risoe Centre on Energy, Environment  
  and Sustainable Development 
Denmark 
 
Mr. Amadou Thierno Gaye 
Laboratory of Atmospheric Physics 
Senegal 
 
Ms. Elena Georgopoulou 
National Observatory of Athens 
Greece 
 
Mr. Marc Gillet 
Ministère de l’écologie  
  et du développement durable 
France 
 
Mr. Koffi Gnronfoun Kodjovi 
Ministere de l'environnement  
  et des ressources forestieres (MERF) 
Togo 
 
Mr. Arnulf Grübler 
IIASA 
Austria 
 
Mr. Jesper Gundermann 
Danish Environmental Protection Agency 
Denmark 
         
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE           
 
              WMO
                                
UNEP 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 
Annex IV- 3 - 
Mr. William Hare 
Greenpeace International/PIK  
Netherlands/Germany 
 
Ms. Monique Hoogwijk 
TSU WGIII 
IPCC-WGIII 
 
Mr. Leen Hordijk 
IIASA 
Austria 
 
Ms. Jinhe Jiang 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
China 
 
Mr. Kejun Jiang 
Energy Research Institute 
China 
 
Mr. Eberhard Jochem 
Fraunhofer Institute Systems  
  and Innovation Research (Fh-ISI) 
Germany 
 
Ms. Mikiko Kainuma 
National Institute for Environmental Studies 
Japan 
 
Ms. Lucka Kajfez Bogataj 
Biotehnical Faculty, University of Ljubljana 
Slovenia 
 
Mr. Tiit Kallaste 
Stockholm Environment Institute, Tallinn Centre 
SEI-Tallinn 
Estonia 
 
Mr. Abdulhamid Kayumov 
Agency on Hydrometeorology 
Tajikistan 
 
Mr. Shigeki Kobayashi 
Toyota R&D Labs. Inc. 
Japan 
Mr. Tom Kram 
Netherlands Environmental 
  Assessment Agency (MNP) 
Netherlands 
 
Mr. Emilio La Rovere 
Institute for Research and Graduate Studies  
of Engineering, Federal University  
of Rio de Janeiro - COPPE/UFRJ 
Brazil 
 
Mr. Erda Lin 
Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences 
China 
 
Mr. Juan Federico Llanes-Regueiro 
University of Havana 
Cuba 
 
Mr. Martin Manning 
Head TSU WGI 
IPCC-WGI 
 
Mr. El-Sayed Mansour 
Ministry of State for Environmental Affairs 
Egyptian Environmental Affairs  Agency (EEAA) 
Egypt 
 
Mr. Kenneth Martchek 
Alcoa Inc 
USA 
 
Mr. Koki Maruyama 
Central Institute of Eletric  
  Power Industry (CRIEPI) 
Japan 
 
Mr Ben Matthews 
Louvain Catholic University 
Belgium 
 
Mr. Mohammad Mazraati 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Austria 
 
         
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE           
 
              WMO
                                
UNEP 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 
Annex IV- 4 - 
Mr. Archie McCulloch 
ICC 
United Kingdom 
 
Mr. Mahmoud Medany 
Central Lab. for Agricultural Climate (CLAC) 
Egypt 
 
Mr. Bert Metz 
Co-chair WGIII 
IPCC-WGIII 
 
Mr. Leo Meyer 
Head TSU WGIII 
IPCC-WGIII 
 
Ms. Jennifer Morgan 
WWF 
Germany 
 
Mr. Shunsuke Mori 
Tokyo University of Science 
Japan 
 
Mr. Richard Moss 
US Climate Change Science Program 
University of Maryland 
USA 
 
Mr. Nebojsa Nakicenovic 
IIASA 
Austria 
 
Mr. Sten Nilsson 
IIASA 
Austria 
 
Ms. Raholijao Nirivololona  
Direction Generale de la Meteorologie  
Madagascar 
 
Mr. Brian O'Neill 
IIASA 
Austria 
 
Ms. Balgis Osman Elasha 
Higher Council for Environment  
  and Natural Resources 
Sudan 
 
Mr. Rajendra Pachauri 
IPCC Chair 
IPCC 
 
Ms. Jean Palutikof 
Head TSU WGII 
IPCC 
 
Mr. Tony Peluso 
Government of Canada 
Canada 
 
Mr. Jim Pennman 
DEFRA 
United Kingdom 
 
Mr. Stylianos Pesmajoglou 
UNFCCC 
Germany 
 
Mr. Ronald Prinn 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
USA 
 
Mr. Battulga Purevdorj  
Ministry for Nature and Environment 
Mongolia 
 
Mr. Klaus Radunsky 
Umweltbundesamt 
Austria 
 
Mr. Nurmohamed Riad 
University of Suriname 
Suriname 
 
Mr. Keywan Riahi 
IIASA 
Austria 
 
         
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE           
 
              WMO
                                
UNEP 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 

 
Annex IV- 5 - 
Mr. Hans-Holger Rogner 
IAEA 
Austria 
 
Mr. José Romero 
Swiss Agency for the Environment, Forest  
  and Landscape 
Switzerland 
 
Ms. Cynthia Rosenzweig 
NASA Goddard Institute of Space Studies 
USA 
 
Mr. Dale Rothman 
Macaulay Institute 
United Kingdom 
 
Mr. Alex Saka 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Malawi 
 
Mr. Martin Schultz 
Max Planck Institute for Meteorology 
Germany 
 
Mr. Ram Shresta 
Asian Institute of Technology 
Thailand 
 
Ms. Leena Srivastava 
TERI 
India 
 
Mr. Taishi Sugiyama 
Central Research Institute of Electric Power 
Industry (CRIEPI) 
Japan 
 
Ms. Umayra Taghiyeva 
Director of Prognosis Bureau  
  of the National Hydrometeorological Department 
Republic of Azerbaijan 
 
Mr. Ferenc Toth 
IAEA 
Austria 
Ms. Eveline Trines 
Treeness Consult 
Netherlands 
 
Mr. Jean-Pascal van Ypersele 
Institut dástronomie et de geophysique 
Belgium 
 
Ms. María Virginia Vilariño 
BCSD 
Argentina 
 
Mr. Jasper Vis 
The Netherlands Society for Nature  
  and Environment (Stichting Natuur en Milieu) 
Netherlands 
 
Ms Rachel Warren 
University of East Anglia 
UK 
 
Mr. David Warrilow 
Defra 
United Kingdom 
 
Mr. Martin Weiß 
Federal Environmental Agency 
Germany 
 
Mr. John Weyant 
Stanford University 
USA 
 
Mr. Azman Zainal Abidin 
Malaysian Energy Centre 
Malaysia 
 
IIASA Conference Staff: 
Ms. Judit Alberti 
Ms. Katalin Dávid 
Ms. Nina Drinkovic 
Ms. Sanja Drinkovic 
Ms. Holmes Hummel 
Ms. Shilpa Rao 
